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The Bottom of the Iceberg:
Unpublished Opinions
HON. DONNA S. STROUD*
ABSTRACT
Most federal intermediate appellate court opinions are “unpublished”—
they have no precedential value, even though they are readily available in
online databases. Most research on judicial behavior is based on analyses
of published opinions. If a court’s decisions not to publish are based on
factors relevant to behavioral research, exclusion of unpublished opinions
may skew the results. Currently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has the lowest percentage of unpublished opinions, while
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has one of the
highest rates of unpublished opinions. Do the differences in publication
rates demonstrate anything about the reasons that judges decide not to
publish cases, and how do these reasons inform selection of cases for
research on the courts? This Article concludes that the publication
decision itself is a form of judicial behavior that is worthy of study, and
that unpublished opinions should be considered in most research on the
federal appellate courts.
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INTRODUCTION
“Compromise is not a bad word for every institution, whether in Congress
or corporate governance or a court.”
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III1
It is a Thursday afternoon, near the end of a busy week. Judge Smith
is in his chambers, looking through the stack of draft opinions on his desk.
Filing day is Monday, and he has several difficult cases that he is preparing
to file. One of these is a draft opinion from Judge Jones for the ABC Inc. v.
First Bank case.2 Judge Smith has seriously considered writing a
dissenting opinion in the case; he believes that Judge Jones’s draft opinion
relies on several cases that it should not have relied on, and unless it is
substantially revised, the opinion may cause additional confusion in the
case law interpreting the statute that is the subject of the draft. Judge Smith
has already discussed his concerns with Judge Jones, and she disagrees
with his analysis of the cases. Judge Vinson, the third judge on the panel,
has already concurred with Judge Jones’s draft and is not inclined to
reconsider his concurrence. Judge Smith had been hopeful that this case
would assist the trial courts and attorneys in dealing with cases that arise
under this statute, since it has been an area of some dispute. This draft,
however, might simply make matters worse.
But writing a full opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part
would take far more time, and this case is already past the court’s usual
1. Telephone Interview with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 2, 2013).
2. This is a fictional case, made up for purposes of this illustration, considered by
fictional judges.
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filing deadline. Judge Smith gets some coffee and walks down to Judge
Jones’s chambers. “Look, Mary, I have been thinking about our discussion
the other day regarding the ABC Inc. v. First Bank case. I just can’t
concur with the rationale, but I can’t get a dissent done right now. I’m OK
with the result in this case, though—would you consider just filing it
unpublished? If you will, I’ll concur in result only and we’ll be done.”
“Sure, Tom. I know you’ve been swamped with those tax cases. I’ll
designate it unpublished and we can get it filed on Monday,” Judge Jones
replies. Judge Smith goes back to his chambers, relieved to have one more
case out of the way. Perhaps he can get his own cases finished now.
What just happened here? All courts that allow judges to issue
unpublished opinions have rules that provide guidance or direction on
when cases should be designated as “unpublished.”3 None of the rules
include as a reason for issuing unpublished opinions that the judge does not
have time to write a dissent before the filing deadline. The issue presented
by the ABC Inc. case is not one that is clearly controlled by existing law, or
Judge Smith would not have needed to dissent at all. Actually, if he had
written it, his dissent might have made an important contribution to the
law.
The ABC Inc. case and the judges in this scenario are all fictional. But
similar scenarios do happen in our appellate courts. There is truly no way
to know precisely how often it happens, and there is no way to determine
that it happens in any particular case. Under local rules of court and the
Code of Judicial Conduct, judges may not discuss their panel deliberations
and decision-making processes in a particular case with those outside the
court.4 No records of such things are made or kept, but all appellate judges
have the experience of working with other judges to reach resolutions of

3. “Published” cases are those designated by the issuing court to be physically
published in official reporter books and, more importantly, to have precedential value. With
the advent of electronic databases and the Internet, the practical physical or financial
constraints on publication of opinions are gone, and electronic research enables attorneys to
research all cases instantaneously, but the old terminology remains. Thus, the term
“unpublished” is a bit misleading, since cases designated as “unpublished” are actually
published electronically, even though they are not physically published in the official
Federal Reporter books. See Adam Liptak, Courts Write Decisions That Elude Long View,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015, at A10 (noting that “technology has turned the term ‘unpublished’
into a misnomer”). Ironically, in 2001, Thomson West began publishing the “unpublished”
federal opinions in books in the Federal Appendix.
4. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); see also
Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1903
(2009) (“[J]udicial decisionmaking takes place in a closed environment and deliberating
judges are bound by propriety and ethics to maintain confidentiality.”).
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cases. Statistics clearly demonstrate that the vast majority of those
deliberations now result in the issuance of an unpublished opinion.5 Some
judges have written about and discussed their own experiences and beliefs
on how judges make decisions about publication and the advantages or
disadvantages of unpublished opinions.6 Other researchers have sought to
identify factors that determine publication decisions based on statistical
analysis of the cases themselves and the characteristics of the court and
judges.7
This Article examines the reasons that judges report for designating
cases as “unpublished,” using interviews and surveys of judges on the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, along
with examination of their rules and customary practices. It also notes
similar practices in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, based on my own
observations as a judge on the court.
I.

THE DEBATE REGARDING UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

There has been much debate about whether courts should designate
cases as “unpublished,” and whether these unpublished cases should be
citable.8 This debate extends to the potential jurisprudential and practical
ramifications of excluding unpublished opinions from the development of
the common law.9 For many judges, lawyers, law professors, and others in

5. From September 30, 2012, to September 30, 2013, the federal courts of appeals,
excluding the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, issued 88.2% of their
opinions as unpublished opinions. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR supp. tbl.S-3
(2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/tables/S03Sep13.
pdf. This number decreased slightly during the twelve-month period ending on September
30, 2014. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.B-12 (2014), http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2014/appendices/B12Sep14.pdf.
6. In Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, Judge Richard S. Arnold of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit discusses his thoughts on unpublished
opinions as a judge “who has produced probably hundreds of unpublished opinions, but has
always felt uneasy about it.” Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 219 (1999).
7. See generally Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4; Deborah Jones Merritt & James
J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001).
8. See generally David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the
Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2005).
9. See id. at 1668–69 (discussing the debate on unpublished opinions and the questions
raised by the development of a “two-track” system for cases in the federal courts). Vladeck
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the legal profession, this debate has been quite intense and has persisted for
many years.10
While this Article acknowledges that debate, the Article’s purpose is
not to examine the wisdom of the federal courts’ practices of issuing
unpublished opinions.11 Instead, the purpose is to examine how judges
and Gulati describe the “Track One” and “Track Two” models of opinions in the federal
courts:
[In] “Track One” cases . . . . [e]ach case is reviewed by three Article III
judges; they read the briefs, study the record, hear oral argument, and deliberate
with their colleagues to reach a decision. Each case is resolved in a carefully
crafted opinion identifying the author and the concurrence (or dissent) of the other
participating judges.
Id. at 1668. On the other hand, unpublished opinions travel the “Track Two” or “black box”
track, where they
are culled early in the appellate process (sometimes even before briefing) for
disposition without argument. Many are processed by staff attorneys or courtemployed legal assistants rather than Article III judges. Although Article III
judges oversee the process, review recommendations, and ultimately “decide” the
cases, our sense is that, in general, judges do not read the briefs, review the record,
or independently research the law. Instead, they rely on staff assistants to provide
them with both an even-handed, balanced appraisal of the case and a proposed
disposition.
Id. at 1669. The debate regarding how unpublished opinions should be used has even
divided the judiciary. See Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial
Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (“The period
since 2002 has seen a bitter dispute over the apparently trivial issue of a proposed and
eventually enacted uniform citation rule splitting the ranks of the federal judiciary . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
10. See generally Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und
Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005)
(describing the intense debate on the treatment of unpublished opinions from the author’s
perspective as reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure). Schiltz says:
On the day that I became Reporter, the issue of unpublished opinions was the
most controversial issue on the Advisory Committee’s agenda. Eight years later,
the issue of unpublished opinions continues to be the most controversial issue on
the Advisory Committee’s agenda. I have devoted more attention to the
unpublished-opinions issue than to all of the other issues the Advisory Committee
has faced—combined. At times, I have devoted more attention to the
unpublished-opinions issue than to all of my children—combined. An Advisory
Committee member once joked that my obituary would be unpublished.
Id. at 1429–30 (footnote omitted).
11. Further, my purpose is not to examine the wisdom of any intermediate appellate
court in the United States in issuing unpublished opinions. The intermediate appellate
courts of the states issue “unpublished” or nonprecedential opinions as well, but this Article
focuses on the federal courts, with a particular focus on the Fourth and Seventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals. Donald R. Songer noted in 1990:
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themselves understand and practice the decision to designate a case as
published or unpublished. The federal circuits each have formal rules that
address the publication of opinions, but these rules vary, and the
publication rates also vary, although the variance in publication rates does
not seem to be directly related to the plain text of the rules.12 The real
reasons for designating cases as unpublished may also reveal just as much
useful information for analysis of the courts as the statistical analysis of the
published cases.
Although the reasons that judges decide to publish cases may be
important for many reasons, this Article focuses on how these publication
decisions may affect statistical research on the courts. We must rely on the
work product of the courts—the opinions—to examine or analyze the work
of the courts or of a particular judge, and that is exactly what many
researchers do.13 If judicial-behavior researchers ignore unpublished cases,
[T]here is no consensus on the wisdom of the practice of nonpublication. Behind
the normative debate over nonpublication are conflicting views as to whether or
not the formal criteria governing publication provide an accurate description in
fact of which cases are selected to be unpublished. There is little controversy over
the abstract notion that cases with no precedential value, no significance for public
policy, and in which the existence of clear precedents give judges no discretion in
decisionmaking should not be published. The important controversy rages over
whether the cases currently designated for nonpublication status are in fact such
cases.
Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 309 (1990).
12. See id. at 313. Even in 1990, Songer, who compiled one of the most frequently
used case databases, concluded that the official rules regarding unpublished opinions did not
seem to explain the courts’ publication practices. See id. After examining the published
and unpublished cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits in 1986, he noted that “[t]he data presented . . . clearly demonstrate that the official
criteria for publication do not provide an adequate description of the differences in practice
between decisions which are published and those which are not.” Id. He further explained:
A significant number of the unpublished decisions of the courts of appeals appear
to involve cases which are non-routine, sometimes politically significant, and
which are nonconsensual appeals which present the judges on the panel hearing
the appeal with an opportunity to exercise substantial discretion in their
decisionmaking. The data suggest that for a number of the unpublished decisions
the outcome of the case might have been different if heard by a different panel of
judges. For other cases the data suggest that while the outcome might have been
the same, a different panel would have been likely to issue a published opinion.
Id.; see also Merritt & Brudney, supra note 7, at 72 (“Each court has formal rules governing
the publication of opinions, but those standards fail to account for variations in publication.
Despite substantial overlap among circuit rules, publication rates differ widely among courts
and even among individual judges.”).
13. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1906–07 (describing the difficulties of
empirical analysis of the opinions of the federal courts, including the inability of this
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they may be omitting relevant information on the behavior of courts. The
assumption that every unpublished case is so designated because it is
entirely uncontroversial or has nothing to add to the development of the
law is simply incorrect.14 Even the process of determining whether a
particular case should be published is a type of judicial decision making,
independent of the substantive issues raised by a case, which could be
relevant to research on courts’ behavior and work.
The decision on publication is not the only decision process by courts
that is hidden from public view. The Supreme Court and highest state
appellate courts do not provide explanations for denying petitions for
analysis to take many aspects of the decision-making process into account, and the
methodological and conceptual challenges presented by these studies).
14. Judges themselves are well aware of this fact. See Arnold, supra note 6, at 224
(noting that “many cases with obvious legal importance are being decided by unpublished
opinions”).
On rare occasions, the United States Supreme Court has commented on the obvious
importance of an unpublished opinion. In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S.
418 (1993), the Court noted, “[w]e deem it remarkable and unusual that although the Court
of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the
court found it appropriate to announce its judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion.”
Id. at 425 n.3; see also Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011) (describing the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jackson v. Felkner, 389 F. App’x 640 (9th Cir. 2010) as
“inexplicable as it is unexplained”).
Another recent example is Justice Thomas’s dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, from
the denial of certiorari in a case from the Fourth Circuit, Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828
(2015) (mem.). In Plumley, Justice Thomas noted:
True enough, the decision below is unpublished and therefore lacks precedential
force in the Fourth Circuit. But that in itself is yet another disturbing aspect of the
Fourth Circuit’s decision, and yet another reason to grant review. The Court of
Appeals had full briefing and argument on Austin’s claim of judicial
vindictiveness. It analyzed the claim in a 39-page opinion written over a dissent.
By any standard—and certainly by the Fourth Circuit’s own—this decision should
have been published. The Fourth Circuit’s Local Rule 36(a) provides that
opinions will be published only if they satisfy one or more of five standards of
publication.
The opinion in this case met at least three of them: it
“establishe[d] . . . a rule of law within th[at] Circuit,” “involve[d] a legal issue of
continuing public interest,” and “create[d] a conflict with a decision in another
circuit.” It is hard to imagine a reason that the Court of Appeals would not have
published this opinion except to avoid creating binding law for the Circuit.
Id. at 831 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)(i), (ii), (v)).
For an excellent description of the increased number of unpublished cases since
1970 and a statistical analysis of publication practices in multiple federal circuits, including
statistics that illustrate the importance of many unpublished opinions from other courts’
citation to those opinions and from the Supreme Court’s review of unpublished opinions,
see Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199 (2001).
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certiorari, even though the vast majority of these petitions are denied
review.15 Some courts issue brief memorandum opinions, summary
affirmances, or brief per curiam opinions that do not contain any legal
analysis.16 In those cases, the court’s decision-making process is totally
hidden. But although unpublished opinions are “unpublished” in that they
have no precedential value, they are readily available to read. They are not
hidden, and although some things cannot be seen, such as Judge Smith’s
reasons for concurring in result only, there is some information that we can
see in the unpublished opinion. Many unpublished opinions also include a

15. In the October Term 2012, 7509 cases were filed in the Supreme Court, but the
Court granted review by certiorari in only 92 of those cases. See U.S. SUPREME COURT,
JOURNAL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: OCTOBER TERM 2012 II (2013),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/jnl12.pdf. In recent years, petitions have been
granted at rates ranging from about 1% to 5%. See History of the Federal Judiciary, FED.
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_petitions_for_certiorari_
2 (last visited May 11, 2015). The votes of at least four of the nine justices are required for
the Court to grant certiorari. See PUB. INFO. OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., A
REPORTER’S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 3 (Nov. 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf. The
United States Supreme Court has explained:
[A] denial of certiorari means only that, for one reason or another which is seldom
disclosed, and not infrequently for conflicting reasons which may have nothing to
do with the merits and certainly may have nothing to do with any view of the
merits taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four members of the Court
who thought the case should be heard.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
A Supreme Court Justice may dissent from the denial of certiorari, so while the
reasons that a dissenting Justice would have granted certiorari are known, the reasons that
the other Justices did not grant certiorari normally remain a mystery. For example, in Smith
v. United States, 502 U.S. 1017 (1991), Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices O’Connor and
Souter, dissented from the Court’s denial of certiorari, noting that in an unpublished
opinion, the Fourth Circuit had “reviewed [Smith’s] conviction in a manner inconsistent
with this Court’s precedents on the application of harmless-error analysis.” Id. at 1017
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Blackmun commented in a footnote that “[t]he
fact that the Court of Appeals’ opinion is unpublished is irrelevant. Nonpublication must
not be a convenient means to prevent review. An unpublished opinion may have a lingering
effect in the Circuit and surely is as important to the parties concerned as is a published
opinion.” Id. at 1020 n.*. Does this footnote hint at one of the unstated reasons that the
majority of the Court voted to deny certiorari? There is no way to know, but sometimes
dissenters tend to address the positions of the majority via an oblique comment. See id. Yet
the Supreme Court has granted review of a number of unpublished opinions, so the
unpublished status of a case certainly does not always protect an opinion from review. See
Hannon, supra note 14, app. A at 241–50 (listing a sample of eighty-three unpublished
opinions reviewed by the Supreme Court from 1974 to 2000).
16. See Elizabeth M. Horton, Comment, Selective Publication and the Authority of
Precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1693–94 (1995).
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full legal analysis and differ from published opinions only in the
Much of the information in an
designation as nonprecedential.17
unpublished opinion is hidden only to the extent that researchers studying
judicial behavior ignore it.
The most frequently stated practical reason for high nonpublication
rates is that it is necessary to deal with the courts’ increasing workloads.18
The federal courts simply cannot issue a fully researched, well-written,
precedential opinion in every single case; instead, they must allocate their
time and effort to those cases that most need and deserve it.19 At least one
federal court explicitly recognizes this workload concern in its Internal
Operating Procedures (IOP): IOP 10 of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit begins with the recognition that “[t]he workload of
the appellate courts precludes preparation of precedential opinions in all
cases,” and notes that “[u]nnecessary precedential dispositions, with

17. Although they are officially nonprecedential, unpublished opinions are sometimes
cited by later published opinions. In addition, some argue that unpublished opinions may
actually “make[] law the wrong way” when they “guide the opinions that follow, but
troublingly, not as deliberately, and not nearly as openly, as precedential opinions do.”
Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 153, 154 (2012). Soucek
describes how portions of text from unpublished opinions regarding different interpretations
of “social visibility” in asylum cases in the Second Circuit have been copied and pasted
without acknowledgement in later published opinions, leading to error in the court’s
analysis of this issue. Id. at 158–61, 171 (discussing Romero v. Mukasey, 262 F. App’x
328, 330, 333 (2d Cir. 2008) and noting subsequent decisions that cited Romero).
18. See Arnold, supra note 6, at 221 (“Why would the federal courts take such a step,
seemingly so much at odds with traditional ways of adjudication? The answer lies in one
word, the same word that describes the most serious problem facing all our courts today:
volume.”).
19. See Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 33 (2002)
(statement of Hon. Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit),
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju80454.000/hju804540.HTM. Kozinski
states:
Writing twenty opinions a year is like writing a law review article every two and a
half weeks; joining forty opinions is like commenting on an article written by
someone else nearly once every week. It’s obvious just from the numbers that
unpublished dispositions get written a lot faster—about one every other day. It’s
also obvious that explaining to the parties who wins, who loses and why takes far
less time than preparing an opinion that will serve as precedent throughout the
circuit and beyond. We seldom review unpublished dispositions of other panels
or take them en banc. Not worrying about making law in 3800 unpublished
dispositions frees us to concentrate on those decisions that will affect others
besides the parties to the appeal.
Id.
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concomitant full opinions, only impede the rendering of decisions and the
preparation of precedential opinions in cases which merit that effort.”20
The process of selecting only the most meritorious cases for
publication has been compared to emergency-room triage; patients with
life-threatening conditions need to receive immediate treatment, while
those who are not in danger will have to wait until medical personnel are
available to assist them.21 But although case triage may be necessary, what
standards do judges actually use to decide which cases need full treatment?
In the emergency room, the medical standards for patient assessment are
reasonably clear and uniformly applied: nurses gather personal information
about the patient’s complaints and status and check temperatures, heart and
respiratory rates, and blood pressures, and follow standards set by the
hospital as to which patients need treatment first. In the courtroom,
however, no clear or uniform triage standards exist. For many cases, most
lawyers and judges would agree that publication is not needed, simply
because the issues presented do not merit publication. But in other cases,
such as the fictional ABC Inc. v. First Bank case, the legal issue is actually
a disputed one that needs to be addressed, but was not, due to workload
considerations.22 Or, were there other hidden reasons as well?
What about Judge Vinson in the ABC Inc. case? Why will he not
reconsider his position? Perhaps he has strong ideological opposition to the
approach that Judge Smith would like to take in the case. Judge Vinson
would prefer to let the law stand as it is, or even with a bit more confusion
added by ABC Inc., because he does not want this case to establish a
definitive interpretation of the statute at issue in the case. Perhaps Judge
Vinson believes that the law does need to be clarified, but thinks that the
briefs in this case were poorly written and the court should wait for another
opportunity to address the issue. Maybe Judge Vinson is very busy and
does not have time to reconsider. In reality, each of the three judges on this
panel may have an entirely different reason for not wanting this case to
have precedential status. Many different factors may be hidden in this one
publication decision.23
Lawyers, the media, the general public, law professors, law students,
political scientists, psychologists, and other judges all examine, parse,
criticize, praise, and analyze the details of cases issued by appellate courts
at every level for many reasons. The Supreme Court of the United States is
naturally subjected to the most intense examination, given its position and

20.
21.
22.
23.

FED. CIR. I.O.P. 10(1).
See Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 8, at 1673.
See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
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power. Yet, the federal intermediate appellate courts are also closely
examined, not just to learn the formal content of the law, but also to
analyze judicial performance and to determine if judges are ruling in
certain ways based on ideologies or other biases. With life tenure, federal
appellate judges tend to serve in their positions for a long time, and
attorneys who practice before them are quite interested in predicting their
predilections.24 Historically, nominees to the Supreme Court often come
from the federal intermediate appellate bench, so their ideological
orientations that are demonstrated at the intermediate appellate level will be
microscopically examined if the judges are nominated to the Supreme
Court.25 Because of their obligations under the Code of Judicial Conduct,26
judges do not simply announce how they might rule on particular issues,
but many people have reasons to try to predict how they might rule, using
the judge’s prior opinions to make these predictions. However, because of
the tremendous number of opinions issued by the federal courts, it is
physically impossible for one person to read and thoughtfully analyze
24. See Ahmed E. Taha, Judge Shopping: Testing Whether Judges’ Political
Orientations Affect Case Filings, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1007, 1035 (2010). Some research
indicates that litigants’ decisions to file cases in a particular court are driven by beliefs about
the court’s ideology:
[T]he political orientations of U.S. district court judges are also important; the
political orientation of federal district judges affects which cases are filed in
federal courts. Plaintiffs file more of certain types of lawsuits—such as product
liability and motor vehicle personal injury suits—when the judges on a court are
politically liberal rather than politically conservative. This demonstrates that
many litigants believe the political orientation of the trial judge can affect who
wins. Fewer plaintiffs seek relief in a court if they believe the judge is less likely
to be sympathetic to their cases.
Id.
25. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice:
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 33 (2004) [hereinafter
Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice]. Choi and Gulati describe the
usual “tournament” of Supreme Court confirmation:
In step two of the current process, the president seems to narrow the candidate
pool on the basis of likely votes on a key subset of political issues such as
abortion, gay rights, affirmative action, sexual harassment, the death penalty, gun
control, and federalism. The candidate’s likely votes on this subset of key issues
become a proxy for the nominee’s fuller range of future voting behavior. And, as
we know from newspaper reports of the recent fights over judicial nominations,
the candidate’s judging record and personal life are magnified and scrutinized to
discern all possible signals of future voting patterns.
Id. (first citing Helen Dewar, GOP Presses for Votes on Judges, WASH. POST, July 30, 2003,
at A4; then citing James Wensits, Chocola Supports Bush Court Nominee, S. BEND TRIB.,
Feb. 14, 2003, at D3).
26. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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every single case.27 Researchers must use statistical analysis to find the
answers to their questions, but to get a valid answer, the researchers must
ask the right questions and use the right data.
No matter how elegant a statistical analysis may be, it is only as good
as its underlying data. Therein lies the problem: even the simplest case
produces very complex data. First, the researcher must select the set of
cases to study, and then, the cases must be read, classified, and coded, or
reduced to a set of numbers that can be plugged into statistical formulas.28
The researcher must determine whether the result in each case is considered
ideologically “liberal” or “conservative” in a study of political orientation,
or favorable or unfavorable to a particular interest or group, or whatever the
relevant feature sought may be. Studies of how frequently a judge’s
opinions are cited and whether those citations are favorable or unfavorable
must also characterize each citation.29 People may disagree on whether a
particular result indicates a certain ideological position—the results of
cases may depend upon procedural or jurisdictional rationales that actually
have no relation to substantive issues or ideology.30 But beyond these
27. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
28. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1922–23 (describing the problems with
selecting and coding cases for the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, also known as the
Songer Database, which has been used by many empiricists).
29. See Robert Anderson IV, Distinguishing Judges: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial
Quality in the United States Courts of Appeals, 76 MO. L. REV. 315, 316–17 (2011)
(discussing empirical research based on citation counts). Anderson determines that the
omission of unpublished opinions in some studies should have no effect on the accuracy of
the research if the researcher is “not . . . attempting to draw inferences about the precedents
created in those dispositions.” Id. at 372. Anderson notes:
[T]he very idea of a study of citations to unpublished opinions is, in a sense, a
contradiction in terms, because unpublished decisions are generally not citable as
precedent. Thus, to the extent one wishes to study the quality of the legal
reasoning that forms part of the body of precedent for later cases, the unpublished
decisions are not relevant.
Id. (citing FED. R. APP. P. 32.1). Yet Anderson recognizes that if “one wishes to draw
inferences about the dispositions of individual cases by the federal courts, citation analysis
may prove less useful than other techniques.” Id. In addition, the legal analysis in an
unpublished case may end up being used by another court without formal citation. See
Soucek, supra note 17, at 170–71. Soucek examines the creation of a line of cases
perpetuating a legal error in the Second Circuit, where copy/paste quotations of language
from unpublished cases led to published cases, which “suggest[s] that to qualify as a social
group, asylees must share a trait that is visible to society at large.” Id. at 171. Soucek
concludes: “This is wrong. But the deeper wrong is that the Second Circuit’s case law on
this subject is guided by a system of ‘precedent’ that is itself not visible . . . . Before now, it
has not been recognized or understood, and even now, it operates in ways almost entirely
unseen.” Id.
30. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1925.
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difficulties that arise even in the most meticulous research, the first inquiry
looks at which cases will be included in the dataset. If some are excluded,
what is the reason for their exclusion?31 Will the exclusion of these cases
leave out meaningful data and result in the wrong conclusions? To answer
this question, we must first consider the actual reasons that the vast
majority of federal appellate opinions are unpublished. In addition, it may
be necessary for the treatment of unpublished opinions to differ based on
the court, since the published cases of a court that publishes a large
percentage of its cases will more likely result in a representative sample of
its work than those of a court that publishes a very small percentage.
To answer these questions, I asked the judges who actually make these
publication decisions every day to describe their experiences. Part II of this
Article describes the study procedure, which included surveys and
interviews with Fourth and Seventh Circuit judges. Part III describes some
of the objective characteristics of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits,
including their caseloads, publication percentages, and official procedures
and rules for making decisions regarding oral argument and publication.
Part IV analyzes the factors that judges consider in making publication
decisions. Part V compares the judges’ responses at each court and
describes how the culture of each court creates and affects the court’s
publication practices. The final Part presents my conclusions regarding the
potential importance and use of unpublished opinions in research on
judicial behavior based on the way that judges make decisions regarding
publication.
II. STUDY PROCEDURE
Although each court has its own official rules and procedures that
address the publication of opinions, these rules do not assist in
understanding how judges actually make the publication decision. While
many have speculated about the various reasons that certain opinions are
unpublished, the literature has not addressed in detail how individual
judges make the publication decision.
As a practical matter, the publication decision is made almost entirely
by the authoring judge, and only nominally by the panel. As one judge put

31. As Edwards and Livermore note, “[p]ublished decisions as a sample of total
decisions are far from random . . . and these cases typically involve more straightforward
applications of law. However, they still dispose of appeals on the merits and offer
information on “a court’s adherence to precedent.” Id. at 1923. Edwards and Livermore
conclude that “any assessment of the work of the courts of appeals that does not include
unpublished decisions cannot be seen as complete.” Id.
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it, “publication is a very individual decision.”32 Although the deliberative
processes are hidden from the public, we know that in recent years, the rate
of published opinions from the Fourth Circuit has been the lowest among
the federal courts of appeals, while the Seventh Circuit’s rate of published
opinions has been the highest.33 Because of this difference in publication
rates, I believed that a comparison of the decision processes regarding
publication at these two courts could shed light on how judges make their
publication decisions.
Each court has essentially three levels of rules that may influence
publication decisions.34 First, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
apply to all federal courts.35 The next level of rules is the internal
procedures of each court, which includes written rules adopted by each
court. The last level is the unwritten culture—the customs and traditions
that each court uses in making these decisions. At the most basic and more
inscrutable level, these decisions are made by each individual judge based
on many factors. This Article examines the unwritten rules and the ways in
which judges actually make their publication decisions.
A. Methods
Research on people always has its difficulties, but research on the
personal thoughts and motivations of federal judges presents far more than
the usual challenges. The first challenge is access: federal judges are not
readily accessible.36 Federal judges are scattered all over the country, and
32. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill.
(Nov. 3, 2013).
I promised all of my interview or survey subjects that I would not identify them,
either directly or indirectly, without specific permission provided after review of any quote
or comment used in this Article. Any information about the subject that I was able to
furnish consistent with my promise of anonymity can be found in the text surrounding the
various quotes or comments.
33. See Orin Kerr, Rates of Unpublished Opinions in the Different Circuits—And
Especially the Fourth Circuit, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 8, 2011, 12:53 PM),
http://volokh.com/2011/09/08/rates-of-unpublished-opinions-in-the-different-circuits-andespecially-the-fourth-circuit/.
34. I will refer to this process as the publication decision, not the nonpublication
decision, although they are both the same. Since the vast majority of cases are now
unpublished, I believe that judges tend to view the decision as an affirmative decision to
publish, almost acknowledging a default of nonpublication.
35. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a)(i) (providing that “[a] court may not prohibit or restrict the
citation of federal judicial opinions . . . that have been . . . designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not
for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like”).
36. I was fortunate to have access to the judges as a fellow appellate judge and based on
my association with the Duke Law School Judicial Studies Program.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/4

14

Stroud: The Bottom of the Iceberg: Unpublished Opinions

2015]

THE BOTTOM OF THE ICEBERG

347

they are very busy. I asked the current active or senior-status judges on the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits to participate in either a written survey, a
telephone interview, or a personal interview, as their schedules permitted. I
also interviewed the general counsel to the circuit executives and clerks of
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. I conducted the interviews in person
either at each circuit’s main courthouse—in Chicago for the Seventh
Circuit, and in Richmond for the Fourth Circuit—or at the judges’ homestate offices. Interviews were not recorded, because I believed that fewer
judges would be willing to participate in recorded interviews. I took notes
during each interview and did my best to record any direct quotes that I
have used in this Article. Any direct quotes of this type that are attributed
to a particular person were also reviewed by the particular judge or
interview subject prior to publication of this Article to ensure accuracy.37 I
was not able to interview or obtain information from all of the judges on
these courts, but I was able to talk to nearly half of the judges on the Fourth
Circuit, and about a third of the active judges on the Seventh Circuit. I
developed questions based on my experience as a judge and based on the
existing literature relating to nonpublication, and I asked the judges if there
were additional factors that influence their publication decisions that I had
not mentioned. In addition to conducting interviews, I observed sessions of
oral argument at both courts.38
Based on the current literature and on the surveys and conversations
with the judges that I interviewed, I have attempted to identify the factors
that judges actually consider in deciding whether to publish and how these
judges vary in their decision processes. Thus, my conclusions are based
primarily on self-reporting by the judges—something that would no doubt
be frowned upon by many empirical researchers.39
But what aspect of human behavior can be studied without asking the
people being studied for their own thoughts on the question? Certainly,
research should go far beyond just asking a question and taking their word
37. However, in the event that any quotes used in this Article are inaccurate in any way,
the responsibility is entirely mine.
38. On a personal note, I would like to express my gratitude to all of the judges and
personnel at each court, all of whom were so gracious in spending their valuable time on
this study and so welcoming to my visits. Judges normally do not have the time or
opportunity to visit courts outside of their own jurisdictions in this way, and having the
chance to examine in some detail how these other courts work was simply a wonderful
educational experience for me as a judge.
39. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 57–58 (2013) (“The premise is sound only if judges
are introspective, only if introspection enables a judge to dredge up from the depths of his
unconscious the full array of influences on his exercise of discretion, and only if judges are
candid in their self-reporting. None of these assumptions is plausible.”).
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for it, but asking these questions is a necessary part of research and may
assist future research. The judges that I interviewed appeared to consider
and answer the questions in a genuinely introspective and candid manner,
although I have no way of knowing if they truly dredged up all of the
influences in the depths of their unconscious minds.40
The motivations and experiences reported by federal judges cannot be
entirely irrelevant or unworthy of study. Judges have a long tradition of
introspection as to how they make decisions,41 and this sort of introspection
has contributed to most of our literature on theories of judicial behavior,
including the nine theories of judicial behavior examined in Judge Posner’s
book, How Judges Think,42 as well as Judge Posner’s own theory of
pragmatic judging. Judicial decision-making is simply too complex to be
fully explained by either purely statistical empirical analysis or by purely
subjective self-reporting,43 but taken together, I believe that each type of
research may inform the other and contribute to the accuracy and
completeness of the end results of each form of study. Given the lack of
research that asks the judges themselves to explain their actions, I have
attempted to give judges this opportunity.
In the same vein, I would be remiss in this study not to reveal my own
background as a judge and the frame of reference I have from my
40. See id.
41. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921). This
work is perhaps the classic text of judicial introspection. Justice Cardozo ponders these
questions:
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information do I
appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the
result? In what proportions ought they to contribute? If a precedent is applicable,
when do I refuse to follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the
rule that will make a precedent for the future? If I am seeking logical consistency,
the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At what point shall
the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some consideration of the
social welfare, by my own or the common standards of justice and morals?
Id.
42. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19 (2008) (noting possible internal
reasons that judges act and rule as they do). These theories are “the attitudinal, the strategic,
the sociological, the psychological, the economic, the organizational, the pragmatic, the
phenomenological, and, of course, what I am calling the legalist theory.” Id.
43. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 57–58. Justice Cardozo also acknowledged:
A richer scholarship than mine is requisite to do the work aright. But until that
scholarship is found and enlists itself in the task, there may be a passing interest in
an attempt to uncover the nature of the process by one who is himself an active
agent, day by day, in keeping the process alive. That must be my apology for
these introspective searchings of the spirit.
CARDOZO, supra note 41, at 13.
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experience as an appellate judge. Since 2007, I have served as a judge on
the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which is the sole intermediate
appellate court in North Carolina.44 The court has fifteen judges45—the
same number of active judges on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.46
Rule 30(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure is the
court’s rule governing unpublished opinions.47 The rule was originally
adopted in 1975 before the advent of electronic databases, when all cases
had to be published in physical books. It provides that the purpose of the
rule is to “minimize the cost of publication and of providing storage space
for the published reports” and that “[i]f the panel that hears the case
determines that the appeal involves no new legal principles and that an
opinion, if published, would have no value as a precedent, it may direct that
no opinion be published.”48

44. See Court of Appeals of North Carolina, N.C. CT. SYS., http://www.nccourts.org/
courts/appellate/appeal/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2015).
45. See NC Court of Appeals Judges, N.C. CT. SYS., http://appellate.nccourts.org/
Bios/?c=2 (last visited Apr. 29, 2015).
46. See List of Judges of the Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.
ca4.uscourts.gov/docs/pdfs/list-of-judges-of-the-court.pdf?sfvrsn=0 (last visited Apr. 29,
2015).
To provide a sense of the workload of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in
2013, 1474 appeals were filed with our court, and we issued 1346 opinions.
Data
Compilation by Marcos DeSouza, Director of Information Systems for the North Carolina
Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals (on file with author). The North
Carolina Court of Appeals issues full opinions in all cases and does not use brief
memorandum opinions that simply state a result. The court also issues unpublished
opinions. In 2013, 63% of the court’s opinions were unpublished. Id. Of my own opinions
issued in 2013, 37% were unpublished. Id.
47. See N.C. R. APP. P. 30(e). Lawyers today who have never had to use actual books
for legal research may fail to appreciate the historical development of the nonpublication
rules. For a fascinating perspective, see the views of Judge Philip Nichols, Jr. in his article,
published by the American University Law Review. See Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective
Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909 (1986). Judge Nichols
graduated from law school in 1932 and began his judicial career in 1964 on the United
States Customs Court.
See History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1759 (last visited May 2, 2015). He then served
from 1966 to 1982 on the United States Court of Claims, and then on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, when that court was created. Id.
48. N.C. R. APP. P. 30(e)(1). Appellate Rule 30(e) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) In order to minimize the cost of publication and of providing storage space for
the published reports, the Court of Appeals is not required to publish an opinion in
every decided case. If the panel that hears the case determines that the appeal
involves no new legal principles and that an opinion, if published, would have no
value as a precedent, it may direct that no opinion be published.
....
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Each associate judge on the North Carolina Court of Appeals has an
executive assistant and two law clerks, and the chief judge has an executive
assistant and three law clerks.49 The court also has an Office of Staff
Counsel, which has ten attorneys. In addition to assisting the court with
petitions and motions, the court’s staff attorneys prepare drafts of opinions
in some cases that are designated as “fast track” cases by the panel to
which they are assigned.50 Most of these “fast track” cases are single-issue
criminal appeals that are clearly controlled by existing law or consist of
“Anders brief” cases51 and are not orally argued, but are issued as
unpublished opinions. If any judge on the panel believes that a case
designated as “fast track” needs additional consideration or oral argument,
that judge can move the case from the fast-track panel to a regular panel for
full consideration. Staff counsel also assist in preparing drafts of opinions
in certain “qualifying juvenile cases,”52 mostly involving terminations of
parental rights, which are heard on an expedited schedule. Although staff
(3) An unpublished decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not
constitute controlling legal authority. Accordingly, citation of unpublished
opinions in briefs, memoranda, and oral arguments in the trial and appellate
divisions is disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing claim preclusion,
issue preclusion, or the law of the case. If a party believes, nevertheless, that an
unpublished opinion has precedential value to a material issue in the case and that
there is no published opinion that would serve as well, the party may cite the
unpublished opinion if that party serves a copy thereof on all other parties in the
case and on the court to which the citation is offered. . . . When citing an
unpublished opinion, a party must indicate the opinion’s unpublished status.
Id. R. 30(e)(1), (3).
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-7 (2013) (providing that “each justice and judge of the
appellate division is entitled to the services of not more than two research assistants, who
must be graduates of an accredited law school”); see also Brenda D. Gibson, Staff Attorney,
N.C. Court of Appeals, The Appellate Process and Jurisdiction (Sept. 9, 2004),
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/200411GibsonAppellateProcess.pdf
(noting that the chief judge of the court of appeals has three law clerks).
50. N.C. R. APP. P. 30(f)(2). Appellate Rule 30(f)(2) provides in part:
The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may from time to time designate a panel
to review any pending case, after all briefs are filed but before argument, for
decision under this rule. If all of the judges of the panel to which a pending
appeal has been referred conclude that oral argument will not be of assistance to
the Court, the case may be disposed of on the record and briefs.
Id.
51. “Anders brief” cases, named after Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), are
cases where appointed counsel believes, after a conscientious review of the record, that
there is no merit to the appeal. See id. at 744. In these cases, counsel must provide the court
with a brief that notes anything in the record that might reasonably support an appeal. See
id. The court will then make a determination as to whether the appeal is frivolous. See id.
52. See N.C. R. APP. P. 3.1.
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counsel does prepare draft opinions for the Rule 3.1 cases,53 and although
these cases are normally not argued, the panels meet and deliberate on
these cases in the same manner as the cases that are on the regular calendar,
and judges often end up writing these opinions in their own chambers.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals does not hear oral argument on
all cases; each panel designates which cases will be argued. In 2013, 7.9%
of the cases decided were orally argued.54 There is no official link between
oral argument and publication on the North Carolina Court of Appeals like
there is on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.55 Although orally argued
cases are more likely to be published, some are not published, and some
cases that were not orally argued are published. Whether published or not,
the author of each opinion is identified (except in the case of per curiam
opinions, which are relatively rare56). The decision to publish a case is
almost always made by the authoring judge, although authoring judges
often request that the other judges on the panel weigh in on whether the
case should be published. From my experience, there is rarely any
disagreement about publication decisions. The final decision to publish a
case is made after the case has been considered by the entire panel after an
opinion has been drafted.57
Another unique feature of North Carolina law may also influence a
judge’s decision to write a dissenting opinion, and perhaps might influence
publication decisions on the North Carolina Court of Appeals: section
7A-30 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides for an appeal of
right to the Supreme Court of North Carolina from any court of appeals
decision “[i]n which there is a dissent.”58 If there is a dissent, the losing
party has a right of appeal to the state supreme court.59 If an opinion of the
53. These drafts come to the panel with a default “unpublished” designation, but the
panel can, and sometimes does, change this to a “published” designation.
54. Data Compilation by Marcos DeSouza, supra note 46.
55. See infra notes 170–78 and accompanying text.
56. See Michael C. Gizzi & Stephen L. Wasby, Per Curiams Revisited: Addressing the
Unsigned Opinion, 96 JUDICATURE 110, 115 (2012) (explaining that “the range of published
dispositions issued per curiam extends from the very rare use in the D.C. Circuit (only
0.3%) to as many as one-fourth (11th Cir.),” and that the average use in most federal courts
of appeals is between 3% and 7%).
57. Although individual judges may differ in their approaches to publication decisions,
I have sought to present a general description of this court’s procedures based on the rules
and practices that are almost always followed by all of our judges. I thank former Chief
Judge John Martin and Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr. of the North Carolina Court of Appeals
for their input and review of my description of the court’s procedures to ensure that I have
presented this accurately. To the extent that I have not, the fault is entirely my own.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (2013).
59. Id.
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court of appeals is unanimous, review by the supreme court is
discretionary.60 In recent years, only a small percentage of petitions for
discretionary review have been granted by the supreme court. In fiscal year
2013, the supreme court granted only 12.5% of petitions for discretionary
review that were docketed in the court.61 Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., who
served on the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
North Carolina prior to his appointment to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, notes that section 7A-3062 gives a dissenting
judge on the North Carolina Court of Appeals the power to grant a right of
appeal to the state supreme court: “Because the North Carolina Supreme
Court does not accept certified questions, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 in effect
empowers a single dissenting judge to do something that the panel of
judges cannot do—grant a right of appeal.”63 This statute may create a
greater incentive for judges on the North Carolina Court of Appeals to
exert the additional time and effort to write a dissenting opinion.
B. Publication Decision Factors
1.

Identification of Factors

The literature arising from the debates on the federal courts’ adoption
of Appellate Rule 32.1,64 which requires all federal circuits to allow
citation of unpublished opinions, addresses many of the reasons that courts
should or should not issue nonprecedential opinions. It was also apparent
to me from my experience as an appellate judge that judges often consider
these same factors in making publication decisions, regardless of the
specific language of the court’s rule on unpublished opinions. Thus, I
asked judges on the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals whether
and to what extent the following factors are relevant to their publication
decision:

60. Id. § 7A-31.
61. From July 1, 2013, to June 30, 2014, the court considered 657 petitions for
discretionary review. See N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, STATISTICAL AND
OPERATIONAL REPORT: APPELLATE COURTS 5 (2014), http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SR
Planning/Documents/2013-14_appellate_courts_ statistical_and_operational_report.pdf. Of
those petitions, 82 were granted, 465 were denied, 80 were dismissed or withdrawn, and 30
were disposed for reasons labeled “other.” Id.
62. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2).
63. Interview with Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C. (Nov. 26, 2013).
64. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
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The case lacks value as a legal precedent, since many prior
cases have addressed the same issue;
No new or novel legal issue is raised by the case;
Efficiency (the need to get cases completed promptly);
Heavy and repetitive caseload in a particular type of case;
Pro se case with poor briefs on both sides, or only one brief
was filed;
Pro se cases with good briefs on each side;
Poorly developed record on appeal;
Great disparity in quality of legal representation between the
parties;
Lack of review (even by internal informal means) by entire
court; a concern that the opinion may not represent the views
of the entire court;
Agreement as to outcome but some disagreement among
panel judges as to the rationale of opinion; the use of
unpublished opinion avoids the need for dissenting or
concurring opinion;
Authoring judge’s lack of experience or expertise in the legal
subject matter of the case;
Avoidance of a bad precedent based on the particular facts of
a case;
The case involves a controversial or politically charged issue.

Table 1 lists my findings relating to these factors from interviews with
judges on the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.
Table 1: Summary of Responses Regarding Publication Decision Factors

Factor
Number

1
2
3
4
13

Factor Description

Jurisprudential Factors
Lack of value as precedent
No new or novel legal issue is
raised by the case
Efficiency
Repetitive/heavy caseload
Controversial
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Fourth Circuit
(7 judges)

Seventh Circuit
(5 judges)

Yes
7
7

No
0
0

Yes
5
7

No
0
0

2
6
3

5
1
4

0
5
2

7
0
3
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5
12
6
7
8

9
10
11

Case-Quality Factors
Pro se case, bad briefs, or just
one brief
Bad facts, hard case
Pro se case, good briefs
Poor record
Legal-representation disparity
Collegiality Factors
No review by entire court
Agreement as to outcome but
not analysis
Lack of expertise

[Vol. 37:333

Yes
7

No
0

Yes
5

No
0

5
4
5
2

2
3
2
5

3
7
4
1

2
0
1
4

N/A
3

4

0
0

7
5

4

3

0

5

Because some of these factors are very similar, I have grouped them,
for purposes of analysis, into three overall categories: (1) jurisprudential
factors (factors 1, 2, 3, 4, and 13), (2) case-quality factors (factors 5, 6, 7, 8,
and 12), and (3) collegiality factors (factors 9, 10, and 11).
The reason behind the grouping of some factors may be more obvious
than others. For example, the thirteenth factor, “the case involves a
controversial or politically charged issue,” may not necessarily seem to fit
under jurisprudential factors, but it fit best in this category based on my
surveys and interviews of the judges. Judges do not avoid publication of a
case solely because of a potentially controversial issue, such as abortion; in
a case that presents a novel issue, the controversial subject matter would
not influence a judge to avoid publication.65 In fact, some judges are more
inclined to publish a case that involves a controversial issue to avoid being
perceived as sidestepping the issue.66 But many of these cases also present
well-settled questions of law, and the mere fact that a case raises a
controversial issue does not determine whether the case should be
published. After all, most federal judges have lifetime appointments and
normally need not fear political repercussions from an opinion, even one
that addresses a controversial issue.67
65. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
66. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
67. See How the Federal Courts Are Organized: Federal Judges and How They Get
Appointed, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe!openform&nav
=menu1&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/183 (last visited May 11, 2015); see also EPSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 39, at 353. Although life tenure means that they need not fear for loss of
their judgeship, some judges may hope for promotion to the United States Supreme Court.
See How the Federal Courts Are Organized, supra. Currently, eight of the nine justices on
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Another caveat is that in most cases, several of these factors are at
play, but no single factor may be controlling. In addition, the views of the
judges on a panel may differ as to the importance of each factor in a
particular case. Some judges have never devoted much thought to the
reasons on which they base publication decisions; rather, they have simply
adopted the practices that are normally followed by their particular court.68
As noted above, the authoring judge almost always has the final say, so the
surveys and interviews primarily focused on how judges personally view
these factors for opinions that they have authored.
While the authoring judge almost always makes the final decision as
to publication on both the Seventh and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, I
asked what other individuals, if any, may influence the publication
decision. In particular, I asked about the contributions of other judges on
the court, including judges on and off the panel, law clerks, staff counsel,
and circuit executives. Another influence to consider is the ability of the
parties to request publication of an unpublished opinion.69
As noted above, judges describe the publication decision as an
individual decision in most cases, and the publication numbers tend to
support this observation.70 Judges on the same court may publish at very
different rates, even though they are all operating under the same written
rules, with the same resources, and in the same court culture. Because the
publication decision is almost entirely discretionary for the author, there is
no right or wrong publication percentage and no objective basis for
claiming that any judge or court should publish more or less. In addition,
some judges change their views on publication over the course of their
tenures on the court.71 Some new judges come to the appellate court with a
preference to publish, only moving to a default position of unpublished
over the years, while others come to the bench with a preference for
nonpublication and begin to publish more frequently with more years of

the Supreme Court previously served as judges on the federal courts of appeals. See
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 350–53 (describing the “auditioners,” judges whose
characteristics of age, legal education, and other qualifications place them into a “promotion
pool” from which appointment to the Supreme Court is more likely than it would be for the
group of federal appellate judges as a whole). Epstein writes that there are some indications
that “auditioners” may have a tendency to “alter their judicial behavior in order to increase
their chances.” Id. at 363.
68. See infra Part II.B.1.c.
69. 4TH CIR. R. 36(b).
70. See supra Table 1.
71. See supra Table 1.
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experience.72 Some judges claim that they stay about the same for their
entire career.73
a.

Jurisprudential Factors

The five jurisprudential factors were identified as follows: the case
lacks value as a legal precedent, since many prior cases have addressed the
same issue (factor number one); no new or novel legal issue is raised by the
case (factor number two); efficiency (the need to get cases completed
promptly) (factor number three); heavy and repetitive caseload in a
particular type of case (factor number four); and the case involves a
controversial or politically charged issue (factor number thirteen). The
jurisprudential factors could also be characterized as workload factors, as a
practical matter, but instead, judges tend to view these factors based mostly
on their understanding of the need—or lack of a need—for more law on a
particular issue. These are the factors that are most commonly stated in the
official written rules and are normally identified by researchers as the
reasons that unpublished opinions need not be considered.74 All of the
judges that I interviewed or surveyed agreed that these factors are the most
important in making decisions on publication.75
The first factor—that the case lacks precedential value because many
prior cases have addressed the issue—was cited as of the highest
importance by all of the judges.76 Of course, the devil is in the details of
how each judge decides what may have precedential value and why it has
value as a precedent. A judge’s ability to predict precedential value has
been questioned by many, including by judges themselves.77 Some judges,
72. See supra Table 1.
73. See supra Table 1. Because of the use of opinions or orders without an identified
author, the changes in an individual judge’s publication percentages over time would likely
be impossible to confirm based solely on publicly available information; only actual
numbers of published authored cases can be determined. I have not sought to do
comparisons of actual numbers of published opinions over an extended time period, as this
would also require consideration of changes in caseloads, periods when a judge may have a
lessened caseload due to illness, or other circumstances which could affect the judge’s work
output. However, an empirical comparison of changes in publication practices based on a
judge’s experience would be a good area for additional research.
74. See supra Table 1.
75. See supra Table 1.
76. See supra Table 1.
77. Most judges seem to accept the factor of precedent potential as entirely proper, and
it is included in the official rules of many courts (including my own, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, under N.C. R. APP. P. 30(e)(1)). Not all judges agree. See, e.g., Arnold,
supra note 6, at 222 (“This practice disturbs me so much that it is hard to know where to
begin in discussing it.”). Arnold explains:
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and certainly some practicing lawyers, believe that even though a legal rule
may be well established, it is useful to have cases addressing the
application of that rule to a variety of fact patterns. Having a published
case addressing a particular fact pattern may provide more guidance to
lower courts and to litigants, thus leading to more cases settling before trial
and fewer appeals. Other judges believe that once the rule is well
established, additional fact patterns alone are not a good reason to
publish.78 Judges also note that it is not uncommon to find unpublished
cases that address issues of first impression.79 One Fourth Circuit judge
noted that “hardly a week goes by without finding an unpublished opinion
that decides a matter of first impression.”80
A few of the judges in the study identified a slightly different view for
determining precedential value. Some favor nonpublication of diversity
cases because such cases would not have precedential value on issues of
state law.81 Even if the federal court addresses state law, the opinion would
not have precedential value in that state, even if the opinion were
published.82 Others believe that although the opinion is not binding on the
state courts, the federal court’s analysis of the issue might be persuasive
I question the proposition that any opinion lacks precedential value. . . . To be
sure, there are many cases that look like previous cases, and that are almost
identical. In each instance, however, it is possible to think of conceivable reasons
why the previous case can be distinguished; and when a court decides that it
cannot be, it is necessarily holding that the proffered distinctions lack merit under
the law.
Id. Songer agrees that determination of precedential value is a subjective decision:
The rules governing publication in the circuits are stated in very broad general
language. No precise, objective guidelines are included. Judges are admonished
to avoid publishing decisions if their opinion would have no precedential value;
but interpretation of such rules is inevitably quite subjective. As a result, it should
not be too surprising that we found that the rules were not applied in a consistent
manner by different judges. In effect, this means that there are potentially a
different set of implicit rules for publication in each circuit and perhaps even for
each combination of judges that sit together in the same circuit. Determination of
what those implicit criteria are is beyond the scope of the present study. It may be
that they are largely unarticulated assumptions that shape the perceptions of
judges about the importance of various cases which are derived from the
socialization, values and experiences of the various judges.
Songer, supra note 11, at 313.
78. See supra Table 1.
79. Anonymous Survey Response (Dec. 8, 2013) (on file with author).
80. Id.
81. See supra Table 1.
82. See Sanders v. Mueller, 133 F. App’x 37, 41 (4th Cir. 2010) (“In a diversity action,
state law of the forum court governs substantive issues . . . .” (citing Dixon v. Edwards, 290
F.3d 699, 710 (4th Cir. 2002))).
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and helpful to trial judges, and thus, they do not consider diversity
jurisdiction to be a factor in the publication decision.83 A judge who had
many years of experience as a federal district court judge noted that when
he was serving as a district court judge, he hesitated to publish a case that
addressed a novel issue of state law in a diversity case because he did not
want lawyers to attempt to use his opinion as binding precedent.84 But
since cases in federal court have the benefit of consideration by a panel of
three judges, and more thorough research than may be available to a single
judge at the trial level, the diversity issue no longer influenced his
consideration of precedential value.85 Although the case would have only
persuasive value in the state whose law was addressed, it may nonetheless
be useful to the bench and the bar.
Jurisprudential factors logically lead to nonpublication of the majority
of cases in areas of law with heavy caseloads, such as immigration and
employment cases, as these cases are so common, and because they often
present similar factual situations with legal issues that have been addressed
in prior cases. Yet the influence of unpublished cases may be significant in
these heavily litigated areas as well, perhaps because there are so many
unpublished cases in these areas of law that are still readily searchable and
may be used to guide the drafting of other opinions.86 Judges also
acknowledge that even cases of a type that frequently appear before the
court may present important and novel issues, or that the lower courts may
be even more acutely in need of appellate guidance because of the
frequency of these types of cases, making them more inclined to publish.87
The next factor, “efficiency; the need to get cases completed
promptly,” was not endorsed by judges at all. This is interesting, since it
was originally one of the main reasons for nonpublication of cases and, as
noted above, is implicitly recognized by Federal Circuit IOP 10.88 In any
individual case, judges claim that they do not consciously consider the
“efficiency” factor, but the “efficiency” systemic factor is always present,
because judges have the option to issue unpublished opinions—an option
that has not always existed.89 Certainly, it would be impossible for the
83. See supra Table 1.
84. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill.
(Nov. 3, 2013).
85. Id.
86. See Soucek, supra note 17, at 160–64.
87. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C.
(Nov. 26, 2013).
88. FED. CIR. I.O.P. 10(1); see text accompanying supra note 20.
89. See Arnold, supra note 6, at 219 (noting that the practice of issuing unpublished
opinions appears to have started in 1964 when the Judicial Conference of the United States
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federal courts to issue a publication-quality opinion in every case, given the
caseloads and court resources at this time. Thus, the efficiency factor is
built into the court’s processes, and it manifests normally as factor 1 or 2,
as the judge believes that the question is well settled by existing law and
there is no need to devote additional time and resources to yet another
published opinion.
Another reason that judges may not endorse an unpublished opinion as
a way to save time and effort is that many judges do not believe that
unpublished opinions are that much easier or quicker to prepare than a
published opinion.90 One judge noted, “I try to write them all the same,
whether published or unpublished.”91 Since all opinions are now available
and searchable in electronic databases, judges do not want to issue clearly
inferior work, even if an opinion is “unpublished.” Even if an unpublished
opinion or order does not identify an author, judges still take great pride in
their work, and each judge who is on the panel can be identified, so they
must devote a certain amount of time and effort to each opinion to make
sure that it is of sufficient quality.92

“issued a general recommendation that judges publish only those opinions ‘which are of
general precedential value’” (quoting ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964))).
90. W. Warren H. Binford et al., Seeking Best Practices Among Intermediate Courts of
Appeal: A Nascent Journey, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 37, 84–85 (2007). Research of the
state appellate courts has also found that judges “have not seen an appreciable decrease in
the amount of preparation time as a result” of issuing unpublished opinions. Id. (quoting the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ response to Binford’s survey).
91. Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Oct.
7, 2013).
92. See Schiltz, supra note 10, at 1486 (citations omitted). Schiltz writes:
Judges are also proud people. They care about their reputations, and they care
about their legacies. Those reputations—and those legacies—are almost entirely a
function of judges’ opinions. Justice Louis Brandeis, when asked whether he was
writing his memoirs, reportedly said: “I think you will find that my memoirs have
already been written.” He was referring, of course, to his opinions. The giants of
the federal appellate bench in the twentieth century—Learned Hand, Henry
Friendly, Richard Posner—owe their reputations in no small part to the fact that
they wrote their own opinions. After Judge Friendly died, the Harvard Law
Review published a series of tributes in his honor. The very first sentence of the
very first tribute was: “Henry Friendly did his own work.” Few judges can write
all of their own opinions today, but they still aspire to leave a respected and
influential body of work. Judges have a strong sense of ownership in their
opinions—which itself explains much of the strong feeling about Rule 32.1.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (1986)).
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Case-Quality Factors

Case-quality factors are particularly difficult for researchers to discern
or quantify in a statistical analysis, but they are quite important to judges in
the publication decision-making process. The ways to deal with casequality issues may also vary by circuit. The ideal is that a published case
that addresses an important legal issue should be based upon a full, welldeveloped record and all of the angles of the case should have been
examined and presented to the court by brief and argument. In a perfect
world, important legal issues would all be presented in this manner, but our
world is not perfect. Records may lack crucial information, and as a
general rule, there is no way to change the record once the case is on
appeal.93 The litigants may have failed to preserve issues for appellate
review, or they may have violated rules of the court in presenting issues.
In criminal cases, defendants will almost always have court-appointed
counsel, so both sides will be presented to the court by attorneys.
Unfortunately, even if all parties are represented by counsel, not all
attorneys have equal ability, and many have little appellate experience.
The overall rate of pro se appeals is quite high, and appointment of counsel
to pro se litigants in civil cases happens rarely.94 In civil cases, litigants
have no right to court-appointed counsel. In both the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, the courts may occasionally appoint counsel to represent parties in
civil pro se cases presenting important issues. Representation is provided
pro bono by law firms that have volunteered to perform this service and
through law-school legal clinics. But the vast majority of pro se appeals
remain just that, and almost all judges agree that they are much less likely
to publish a case that was presented pro se, mainly because of the poor
presentation of the case or the absence of a valid legal issue.95
Most judges agree that the quality of the representation by counsel is
reflected in the quality of the opinion, or as one judge put it, “almost all bad
judgments are from bad lawyering,” and judges try to avoid publishing bad
judgments.96 However, most judges also agree that poor briefs are not
typically a reason to avoid publication; poor briefs just create more work
for the court, since the judges must make sure that the issues are fully

93. See FED. R. APP. P. 10(c)–(e).
94. LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 38–39 (2d ed. 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/caseman2.pdf/$file/caseman2.pdf.
95. See supra Table 1.
96. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill.
(Nov. 3, 2013).
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researched.97 Because these case-quality factors create more work for the
judge who must write an opinion in a poorly presented case, the “effort
averse” judge may decide that it is not worth the effort.
According to the famously prolific Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A.
Posner,98 effort aversion, which “includes both reluctance to work ‘too’
hard . . . and reluctance to quarrel with colleagues,” is an integral part of
judicial decision-making.99 Unsurprisingly, Judge Posner believes that the
option to issue opinions as unpublished tends to be overused by federal
judges, but he acknowledges that case-quality factors properly lead to
nonpublication of many cases.100
c.

Collegiality Factors

It is paradoxical that the judges seem to disagree on the importance of
the collegiality factors more than the other factors. Former Chief Judge
Harry T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has described a collegial court as a court where “judges
have a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law
right, and . . . as a result, [they] are willing to listen, persuade, and be
persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect.”101 A court’s
97. See, e.g., id.
98. In addition to publishing more cases than other judges on the court, Judge Posner
has authored more than forty books and more articles than I could count. In fact, he has
written so much that there is a book devoted to quotes from his court opinions. See THE
QUOTABLE JUDGE POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
(Robert F. Blomquist ed., 2010).
99. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 7 (“Both [effort aversion and conflict aversion] are
aspects of the ‘quiet life’ that is especially valued by persons in jobs that offer little upward
mobility—and in the case of a federal judgeship involve virtually no downward mobility—
and few opportunities for increasing their pecuniary income other than by quitting and, in
the case of judges, having quit, going into the private practice of law.”).
100. See id. at 55. Judge Posner explains:
The vast majority of unpublished decisions are affirmances, and . . . this is a
reflection of the signal lack of merit of most cases filed in the federal district
courts. It doesn’t cost much to file a case; the filing fee is low and the plaintiff is
not required to be represented by a lawyer. There are also many incompetent
lawyers, many potential plaintiffs who have very low opportunity costs of suing
(prison inmates, for example), and many emotional plaintiffs with a deep sense of
having been wronged who will sue even if there is no substantial legal ground for
suing. These cases are losers and the unpublished decisions affirming their
dismissal have little impact on the law, especially since most such decisions
cannot be cited as precedents.
Id.
101. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2003) (citing Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-
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collegiality and its productivity are closely related. Judge Edwards notes
that work on “the appellate bench is a group process.”102 Court collegiality
is a part of each courts’ culture, which some researchers have described as
including “sociability” and “solidarity.”103 “Sociability” is “the degree to
which judges and administrators get along and emphasize the importance
of social relations,” and “solidarity” is “the degree to which a court has
clearly stated and shared goals, mutual interests, and common tasks.”104
The Judicial Conference of the United States has recognized that
collegiality is part of the very definition of a “court”:
An appellate “court,” in this special sense, is not merely an administrative
entity. Nor should it consist of a large group of strangers—like a jury
venire—who are essentially unknown to one another. Rather, a “court” is a
cohesive group of individuals who are familiar with one another’s ways of
thinking, reacting, persuading, and being persuaded. The court becomes an
institution—an incorporeal body of precedent and tradition, of shared
experiences and collegial feelings, whose members possess a common
devotion to mastering circuit law, maintaining its coherence and
consistency (thus assuring its predictability), and adjudicating cases in like
manner.105

I have identified the factors that I call “collegiality factors” as lack of
review (even by internal informal means) by entire court so that the opinion
may not represent the views of the entire court (factor number nine);
agreement as to outcome but some disagreement among panel judges as to
rationale of opinion so the use of unpublished opinion avoids the need for
dissenting or concurring opinions (factor number ten); and the authoring
judge’s lack of experience or expertise in the legal subject matter (factor
number eleven).
These factors are grouped under “collegiality” because they are ways
in which the judges work together and strive to make a clear and consistent
presentation of the law from the court. Since published opinions carry
Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605,
1612–13 (1995)). Further, Judge Edwards describes collegiality as “a process that helps to
create the conditions for principled agreement, by allowing all points of view to be aired and
considered.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
102. Id. at 1656.
103. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Court Culture, in CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS:
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, at 1, 2 (Court Statistics Project, Nat’l Ctr. for
State Courts, Caseload Highlights Vol. 11, No. 2, May 2005), http://cdm16501.
contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctadmin/id/664.
104. Id.
105. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
44 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/FederalCourts
LongRangePlan.pdf.
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precedential value, these opinions are binding on the court in the future,
and judges believe it is important both to get the law right and to ensure
that no other members of the court have serious objections or reservations
to a particular opinion.106 For both the Fourth and Seventh Circuit courts,
the final publication decision is almost always made by the authoring
judge.107 The author has essentially unlimited discretion in this decision.108
Other judges on the panel or on the court may recommend publication, but
typically, the other judges defer to the author, and recommendations to
publish an opinion that was written as an unpublished opinion are
uncommon.109 Authoring judges consider a recommendation to publish
very seriously, and often will convert the opinion to a published opinion,
although it may require more work to perform additional research and add
more analysis to the draft.110 Law clerks may also recommend for or
against publication, and judges tend to take these recommendations
seriously.111 Very seldom, staff counsel, the circuit executive, or a clerk
may recommend publication, particularly in a case that raises an issue that
comes up frequently in a certain type of case, and where they believe that
more guidance to the trial courts would be helpful.112 But ultimately, the
authoring judge has the final say in the publication decision.113 For this
reason, looking at the written rules of the court for guidance on the
publication of judicial decisions tells us very little. Each judge makes her
own decisions independently, weighing all of the factors discussed
independently, and judges tend to view the rules and the reasons for
publication a bit differently.114
The tenth factor, the agreement not to publish to avoid dissent, is the
scenario that attorneys fear the most. The judges disagree only on the
analysis or legal reasoning for this outcome, and the compromise will allow
106. See Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh,
N.C. (Nov. 26, 2013); Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 3, 2013); Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 7, 2013); Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 2, 2013); Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, Va. (Sept. 17–19, 2013).
107. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); see also Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, supra note 106.
108. Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits,
supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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the court to get the opinion completed more quickly. But are the judges
really just seeking a certain result at the expense of the law? Are they
engaging in “effort aversion” by avoiding the work of writing a dissent?115
Nearly all judges agree that they have seen this happen, but this is not a
“deal” to get a benefit in the future or to get a particular result.116 All of the
judges in my study who acknowledged that this type of compromise does
occur also agree that this is done only in cases where the judges agree on
the result of the case—meaning the outcome for the parties will be the
same either way.117
Some empirical research based on published cases has indicated that
judges do “bargain” to reach compromises in the rationale of published
opinions.118 It is perhaps no coincidence that the idea of bargaining or
compromise among panel judges tends to inspire intense disagreement, as
this sort of behavior strikes at the heart of the divide between philosophical
theories of adjudication. The importance of deliberations and collegiality

115. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 7, 385–86. The authors write:
We have found that like other workers judges exhibit in their judicial behavior
leisure preference and, something that includes but goes beyond leisure
preference, effort aversion—as when appellate judges yield to the views of
colleagues rather than insisting on dissenting every time they hold contrary views,
or dissent less frequently the heavier their caseload grows.
Id. at 385–86. For a detailed analysis of the use of dissents in the federal courts of appeals
and the United States Supreme Court, see id. at 255–304. Yet, dissent aversion cannot be
fully explained by “leisure preference.” See Renée Cohn Jubelirer, The Behavior of Federal
Judges: The “Careerist” in Robes, 97 JUDICATURE 98, 100 (2013) (“The authors [of The
Behavior of Federal Judges] do not explain why [leisure preference is] more important than
other non-monetized factors, such as the intrinsic interest of the work, prestige or pride, a
sense of accomplishment or value in the work, or the social dimension of the work.”).
116. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in
Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 742 (2008) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Trading
Votes for Reasoning] (“We are suggesting a form of logrolling—behavior considered
common in legislatures. But the view with respect to courts appears to be that judges would
not engage in such unseemly behavior.” (citing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 156–57 (2007))).
117. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, supra note 106.
118. Choi & Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning, supra note 116, at 739. “The
multimember panel studies indicate that the votes of judges are influenced by the ideologies
of other judges on the same panel. Either to maintain collegiality, to avoid a judge’s
breaking away to author a dissenting opinion, or simply because of group dynamics, judges
appear to moderate their voting in settings where there is potential diversity in political
views.” Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/4

32

Stroud: The Bottom of the Iceberg: Unpublished Opinions

2015]

THE BOTTOM OF THE ICEBERG

365

in judicial decision-making has been debated by the legal realists119 and
legalists120 for many years.
Research indicates that these differences between judges are not the
traditional ideological differences, but they may have significant influence
on how the judge works with other judges to decide a case.121 For example,
some judges may be characterized as “outcome judges” who care more
about the vote in a particular case, while others are “precedent judges” who
care more about the “legal precedent established through the reasoning” of
the majority opinion.122 In recent years, some researchers have proposed
expanding the traditional classifications of judges beyond ideology to
include many factors, including the interactions of judges on the panel or
court.123
119. Richard A. Posner, Realism About Judges, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 578 (2011).
The traditional conception of legal realism views the judge as merely a discoverer and
transmitter of the law:
The modern idea of the judge as analyst shares with the idea of the judge as oracle
the assumption that legal questions always have right answers: answers that can be
produced by transmission from an authoritative source, though in the modern view
the transmission is not direct but is mediated by analysis.
Id.
120. Id. at 580. Judge Richard Posner, likely one of the most prolific and pertinacious
current proponents of legal realism, claims that Judge Harry Edwards “is the most
pertinacious current critic of legal realism as a positive theory of judicial
behavior . . . . Judge Edwards contends that the realist scholars exaggerate the degree to
which judges are unable to achieve agreement through deliberations that, overriding
ideological and other differences, generate an objectively correct decision.” Id. (first citing
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV.
1335 (1998); then citing Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the
“Politics” of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
619 (1985); and then citing Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1908–10).
121. See Choi & Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning, supra note 116, at 746 (citations
omitted).
122. See id. at 742, 746; see also Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the
Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1415–16 (2009) (citing DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 22 & tbl.2.1, 26 (2002)).
123. See Corey Rayburn Yung, A Typology of Judging Styles, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1757,
1757 (2013) [hereinafter Yung, Typology].
For example, Professor Yung proposes nine different “distinctive judicial decisionmaking styles” for federal appellate judges: Trailblazing, Consensus Building, Stalwart,
Regulating, Steadfast, Collegial, Incrementalist, Minimalistic, and Error Correcting. See id.
at 1761–62. An exposition of these types is beyond the scope of this Article, but Yung
found that these nine decision-making styles did a better job of predicting future votes than
the traditional ideological model. See id. at 1803. Of particular relevance to the
consideration of collegiality was the finding that
the two most basic dispositional choices an appellate judge could make, to dissent
or reverse, were both better explained using the judge style categories. In the case
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III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT
COURTS OF APPEALS
One of the notable differences between the Fourth and Seventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals is the difference in the judges’ views as to the most
controversial factor—the compromise to issue an unpublished opinion
when the panel agrees on the outcome but not the analysis. On the Seventh
Circuit, no judge endorsed this factor as having an influence on the
publication decision.124 On the Fourth Circuit, several judges endorsed
compromise and gave well-considered reasons for this approach.125 For
example, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III cited authority for his position,
noting that the United States Supreme Court has endorsed “flexibility in the
processes of the Courts of Appeals” in Pearson v. Callahan,126 which he
identified as “one of the most important cases of the last decade,” and a
case that is “very insightful about how courts operate.”127 He noted that
compromise on a narrow or broad ground for a decision is “a mechanism to
reach consensus. Compromise is not a bad word for every institution,
of predicting the dissenting judge, the classic ideology-based model showed just
modest improvements over predictions based upon a random guess with model
consistency levels of approximately 40 to 46%. The judicial typology model, in
contrast, was accurate in approximately 72 to 90% of cases tested (depending
upon a variation in the model). The decision to reverse by a panel, and not just an
individual judge, was also better explained by the judicial typology model.
Corey Rayburn Yung, How Judges Decide: A Multidimensional Empirical Typology of
Judicial Styles in the Federal Courts 4 (Feb. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (Northwestern
University School of Law & University of Chicago Law School Workshop on Judicial
Behavior) [hereinafter Yung, How Judges Decide].
124. Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago,
Ill. (Nov. 3, 2013).
125. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C.
(Nov. 26, 2013); Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit (Oct. 7, 2013); Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit (Oct. 2, 2013); Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in Richmond, Va. (Sept. 17–19, 2013).
126. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009). Justice Samuel Alito, himself a
former judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote this unanimous opinion, which
eliminated the two-step analysis that had previously been required by Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 199–200 (2001). Part of the rationale for this change was that the Saucier rule
“create[d] a risk of bad decisionmaking” when the “briefing of constitutional questions is
woefully inadequate” in the lower court, and that, in some cases, “a court will rather quickly
and easily decide that there was no violation of clearly established law [the second prong]
before turning to the more difficult question whether the relevant facts make out a
constitutional question at all [first prong].” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239. These cases tend to
be very fact-specific and contribute little to the law, although the two-step analysis created
more work for the trial court. See id.
127. Telephone Interview with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, supra note 1.
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whether in Congress or corporate governance or a court.”128 His comments
are consistent with his reputation as a collegial judge.129
Other judges view this sort of compromise with suspicion. Judge
Richard S. Arnold of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit presented a hypothetical example of “some of the effects” that the
use of unpublished opinions can have “on the psychology of judging”:
[I]f, after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain
decision should be reached, but also believes that the decision is hard to
justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result, assuming agreement
by the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished
opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug. Again, I’m not saying
that this has ever occurred in any particular case, but a system that
encourages this sort of behavior, or is at least open to it, has to be subject to
question in any world in which judges are human beings.130

Former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit Patricia Wald also disapproves of this type of
compromise:
I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision
incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming
public debate about what law controls. I have even seen wily would-be
dissenters go along with a result they do not like so long as it is not
elevated to a precedent. We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues
under the rug, though most will not stay put for long.131

Why is there a difference in the view of the compromise on analysis
and issuance of an unpublished opinion between these two circuits? At this
point, I can say only that it seems to exist and speculate as to why. The
Fourth Circuit does have a larger caseload, and due to the court’s policy of
circulating all published opinions to the entire court, the court has even
more work to do on the published cases than the Seventh Circuit, which
does not circulate all published cases to the entire court prior to issuance.132

128. Id.
129. See Yung, How Judges Decide, supra note 123, at 51 (“[T]here are a lot of good fits
in terms of similarities between impressionistic and quantitative categorization. Judge
Wilkinson, a judge who has long championed collegiality among judges is designated as a
Collegial Moderate Republican.” (citing J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth
in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1170 (1994))).
130. Arnold, supra note 6, at 223.
131. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995).
132. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); 4TH CIR. I.O.P.-36.2; see also U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK FOR APPEALS TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 155 (2014), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/
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The Fourth Circuit’s workload may lead to more of a need for compromise
to get the work done in a timely manner and more of a need to focus work
on the very small percentage of published cases so that they will be of
sufficient quality to be issued as precedential opinions. Yet none of the
Fourth Circuit judges specifically endorse efficiency, or the need to get
cases done, as a reason for nonpublication; as noted above, this factor is
built into the court’s rules and operating procedures at two levels—the
selection of cases for oral argument, and the decision whether to publish
following oral arguments.133
The difference in views on the compromise to issue an unpublished
opinion is not explained by ideology, since this is not a traditional liberal–
conservative ideological issue.134 Given the individual and entirely
discretionary nature of the publication decision, the decision-making styles
of the individual judges may be the crucial distinction.
Yung’s
classifications of the decision-making styles on these two circuits seem to
fit with the results of my interviews. Although his data is based only on
cases from 2008, and not all the same judges are on the two courts now,
many are the same. Although he did not consider the judges’ views on
unpublished opinions specifically, he did consider collegiality, and the
publication decision is an element of collegiality, although it has been
expressed in the literature normally as “dissent avoidance” while the
decision not to publish might be called “precedential opinion avoidance.”
Yung’s distribution of judges on the Fourth and Seventh Circuits by
decision-making style is shown in Table 2 below:135
Table 2: Decision-Making Styles on the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
Decision-making style

Fourth Circuit

Seventh Circuit

Error-correcting

25%

21%

Regulating

17%

14%

Collegial

41%

22%

rules/handbook.pdf [hereinafter SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK] (“Copies of a proposed
opinion or order are circulated to members of the panel . . . .”).
133. See infra notes 166–76 and accompanying text.
134. In any event, neither circuit seems to have extreme ideological variance among the
judges, as some other circuits do. See Yung, Typology, supra note 123, at 43 fig.20.
Yung’s analysis of data from 2008, which included unpublished opinions, of the average
ideological variance on all of the federal courts of appeal determined that variance on the
Fourth Circuit was 10.5, while the Seventh Circuit was 10.3. The highest average
ideological variance was on the Sixth Circuit, at 36.1. See id. at 12, 43 fig.20.
135. See Yung, How Judges Decide, supra note 123, app. D at 77, 79.
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17%
--

369
29%
14%

The main differences between the two courts fall under collegiality
and pragmatism. Again, this is not surprising, with Judge Wilkinson being
well known for his promotion of collegiality,136 and Judge Posner likely the
most famous pragmatist among the federal judges.137 In addition,
collegiality appears to lead to a willingness of panel members to
compromise, which may lead to issuance of an unpublished opinion with
what all agree to be the correct result, although all do not agree on the legal
rationale. The idea of an agreement to compromise by issuing an
unpublished opinion reaching the result that the entire panel agrees on,
even if lacking complete agreement on rationale, is thus acceptable to some
judges and not acceptable to others. Most judges acknowledge that this
happens, although most seem to disavow any personal participation in such
an agreement.
Judges on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals were also more likely
to cite a lack of experience or expertise in an area of law as a potential
reason not to publish an opinion.138 As one judge noted, a lack of expertise
in a subject area “could be a factor, in immigration, ERISA, specialized
areas—it depends on time you have to study the area of law. If you are
advancing something neither side advocated, it is probably tricky. You
may not know why they did not bring it up.”139 Judges on the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals were less likely to endorse this factor.140 One
judge jokingly responded, “We’re all experts in everything.”141 He also did
not endorse lack of expertise as influencing the publication decision.142
Yet, the expertise factor is likely tempered by the fact that on both courts,
the chief judge on a panel assigns the cases to members of the panel and
may consider the interest or expertise of each judge in making these
assignments. The fact that the chief judges consider expertise in making
case assignments indicates that the factor is of some concern to the court.
136. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
137. See Gavin Broady, The Prolific Pragmatist: Judge Richard Posner, LAW360 (Mar.
25, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/520805/the-prolific-pragmatist-judgerichard-posner (discussing Judge Posner’s reputation for pragmatism on the bench).
138. See supra Table 1.
139. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C.
(Nov. 26, 2013).
140. See supra Table 1.
141. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill.
(Nov. 3, 2013).
142. Id.
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But the cases are still assigned to panels at random on both courts, so even
if the court has a judge with great expertise in a particular area, that judge
may not end up on the panel that considers the case.143 And on both courts,
judges may sometimes consult other judges who are not on the panel.144 In
any event, the judges tend to draw on the experience and expertise of the
other members of the court, which is part of the collegiality of the court.145
The last collegiality factor, lack of review by the entire court, is also
important to both courts, even if the judges do not specifically endorse it, as
it is addressed by the rules and procedures of each court.146 In the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, all published opinions are circulated to the entire
court before opinions are issued.147 This circulation process means that
each judge must read and consider not only the cases that she has been
assigned but also cases that other panels have considered if the panel wants
to publish the opinion. This circulation procedure increases the judges’
workload even more in a court that already has a heavy caseload.
Additionally, a judge may feel hesitant to publish an opinion, knowing that
publication will require circulation, adding to the workload of all of the
judges. If any judge has serious questions about an opinion, the authoring
judge will normally address these questions.148 If an opinion is published,
this usually means that none of the judges have any serious objections to
the opinion.149 Judges who are not on the panel hearing the case tend to
defer to the panel, but their views are still considered.150 In addition, if a
judge has serious questions about a case that has been circulated for
publication, the judge may call for en banc review of the case, which
allows all members of the court to participate in the decision.151
At the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, opinions are not routinely
circulated to the entire court prior to publication, but all published opinions
143. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 10; see also 4TH CIR.
I.O.P.-34.1.
144. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, supra note 106.
145. See id.
146. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 160; see also FED. R. APP. P.
35; supra Table 1.
147. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); see also 4TH CIR. I.O.P.-36.2.
148. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, supra note 106.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. But see FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (providing that “[a]n en banc hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration
is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance”).
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are circulated to all judges when they are issued.152 The Seventh Circuit
judges note that a motion for rehearing may be filed and a case may be
reconsidered.153 In addition, under the Seventh Circuit’s Rule 40(e), a case
that overrules a prior precedent or conflicts with another circuit is
circulated prior to issuance and the court may decide to hear the case en
banc.154 Thus, although the Seventh Circuit judges do not explicitly
consider whether the entire court would agree with a particular opinion, the
court does have procedures in place to avoid major disagreements among
the panels.
IV. CIRCUIT CHARACTERISTICS
A. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which sits in Richmond,
Virginia, hears appeals from the nine federal district courts in Maryland,
Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, as well as
from federal administrative agencies.155 Fifteen judges currently serve on
the Fourth Circuit,156 with one judge who assumed senior status in 1999,157
and another judge who received senior status in 2014.158
Although the court has had its full complement of authorized judges
since December 2010, there were several vacant seats for many years.159
North Carolina suffered from years of senatorial stalemates in the
confirmation process, leaving several seats on the Fourth Circuit open for
152. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 155, 160 (citing 7TH CIR. R.
40(e) (providing for sua sponte rehearing before decision)).
153. Interview with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note
124.
154. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 160.
155. See About the Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.
gov/about-the-court/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). For a summary of the procedures and
statistics for all federal courts of appeals as of 2010, see HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at
30–32.
156. See Judges of the Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
157. See Senior Judge Clyde H. Hamilton, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR.,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/senior-judge-clyde-h-hamilton (last
visited Apr. 18, 2015).
158. See Senior Judge Andre M. Davis, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.
ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/senior-judge-andre-m-davis (last visited Apr.
18, 2015).
159. See Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 2163
(2011) (noting that “[f]or over thirty months, the [Fourth Circuit] functioned without a
quarter of its judicial complement, and for more than a year absent one-third”).
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years.160 In fact, the seat vacated by Judge James Dickson Phillips, Jr., who
assumed senior status on July 31, 1994, languished for sixteen years, until
Judge James Wynn was commissioned on August 10, 2010, to fill the
vacant seat.161 Judge Albert Diaz was commissioned on December 22,
2010, to fill the seat vacated by Judge William Walter Wilkins, who
assumed senior status on July 1, 2007.162 Judge Allyson Duncan,
commissioned on August 15, 2003, filled the seat previously held by Judge
Samuel James Ervin, III, who died in 1999.163 Although the court used
senior judges and district court judges sitting by designation to attempt to
fill the void, some observers believe that the protracted vacancies may have
contributed to the Fourth Circuit’s low publication rate.164 Recent court
160. See id. Tobias writes:
The appointment of federal judges has grown extremely controversial.
Allegations and countercharges, interparty squabbling and unceasing retribution
have punctuated the appeals court selection process for the last quarter century.
These phenomena were ubiquitous during the administration of President George
W. Bush as well as in nominations and appointments to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, especially regarding judgeships assigned to North
Carolina. Over the Bush Administration’s concluding half term, the White House
proffered six nominees for the appellate court’s five vacant positions; the 110th
Senate promptly confirmed a single prospect and did not even grant votes to the
remainder.
Id.
161. See Phillips, James Dickson Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInf
o?jid=1879&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 18, 2015); Judge James A.
Wynn, Jr., U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judgesof-the-court/judge-james-a-wynn-jr- (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
162. See Judge Albert Diaz, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/judge-albert-diaz (last visited Apr. 18, 2015);
Wilkins, William Walter, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2586&
cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
163. See Judge Allyson K. Duncan, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/judge-allyson-k-duncan (last visited Apr. 18, 2015);
Ervin, Samuel James III, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=715&
cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
164. See Tobias, supra note 159, at 2163. Tobias notes:
The openings have undercut the Fourth Circuit’s delivery of justice because the
court was forced to operate without as many as five of the fifteen court of appeals
judges whom Congress has authorized. For over thirty months, the court
functioned without a quarter of its judicial complement, and for more than a year
absent one-third. In fact, the court furnishes published opinions for six percent of
appeals that it resolves, and the court holds oral arguments in thirteen percent, the
least among the twelve regional circuits. From September 1999 until August
2003, the Fourth Circuit had no active member from North Carolina, and during
the ensuing seven years merely one active judge represented the state on the court.
Id.
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statistics indicate that the Fourth Circuit’s cases are handled mostly by the
resident active judges; resident senior judges and visiting judges participate
in fewer cases than in any other federal district.165
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, each circuit adopts
its own local rules regarding how cases will be set for argument and how
publication decisions will be made.166 In the Fourth Circuit, the publication
decision is governed by Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36.167 That rule provides
that “[o]pinions delivered by the Court will be published only if the opinion
satisfies one or more of the standards for publication.”168 Those standards
include:
i. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law
within this Circuit; or
ii. It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
iii. It criticizes existing law; or
iv. It contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not
duplicative; or
v. It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or creates a
conflict with a decision in another circuit.169
Fourth Circuit Rule 36 further provides that “[t]he Court will publish
opinions only in cases that have been fully briefed and presented at oral
argument,” and “[o]pinions in such cases will be published if the author or
a majority of the joining judges believes the opinion satisfies one or more
of the standards for publication, and all members of the Court have
acknowledged in writing their receipt of the proposed opinion.”170

165. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
UNITED STATES COURTS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, at U.S.C.A. tbl.6 (2012),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/rpt/2012_report.pdf. For the twelve-month period ending on
December 31, 2012, visiting and senior judges participated in about 6.9% of cases in the
Fourth Circuit. Id. In contrast, senior or visiting judges participated in about 23.2% of
cases at the Seventh Circuit. Id. The Ninth Circuit, which has by far the greatest caseload
of the federal courts, used senior or visiting judges in about 30.6% of its cases in the same
time period. Id.
166. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been (i)
designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the
like . . . .”); id. R. 34(a)(1) (“Any party may file, or a court may require by local rule, a
statement explaining why oral argument should, or need not, be permitted.”).
167. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
THE
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Additionally, “[a] judge may file a published opinion without obtaining all
acknowledgments only if the opinion has been in circulation for ten days
and an inquiry to the non-acknowledging judge’s chambers has confirmed
that the opinion was received.”171 Fourth Circuit Rule 36(b) provides basic
guidelines for unpublished opinions.172
Because Fourth Circuit Rule 36(a) provides that all published opinions
must have been “fully briefed and presented at oral argument,” the decision
not to permit argument in a case is essentially a preemptive decision that
the case will be unpublished.173 In rare instances, a judge may have a case
that was originally scheduled to be considered on the briefs reset for
argument, but normally, a case that is not argued will not be published.174
Thus, Federal Rule 34(a) is also important in the publication decision
process. Federal Rule 34(a) provides, in part, that “[o]ral argument must be
allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who have examined
the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument is
unnecessary” because “the appeal is frivolous,” “the dispositive issue or
issues have been authoritatively decided,” or “the facts and legal arguments
are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.”175
Although Federal Rule 34 may, at first glance, seem to be a rule of
inclusion—that “oral argument must be allowed in every case” unless
excluded by the panel—in practice, it is more a rule of exclusion.176 The
usual practice is that the vast majority of cases are not argued,177 and the
171. Id.
172. Id. R. 36(b). Fourth Circuit Rule 36(b) provides:
Unpublished opinions give counsel, the parties, and the lower court or agency a
statement of the reasons for the decision. They may not recite all of the facts or
background of the case and may simply adopt the reasoning of the lower court.
Published and unpublished opinions are sent only to the trial court or agency in
which the case originated, to counsel for all parties in the case, and to litigants in
the case not represented by counsel. Published and unpublished opinions are also
posted on the Court’s Web site each day and distributed in electronic form to
subscribers to the Court’s daily opinion lists. Published and unpublished opinions
issued since January 1, 1996 are available free of charge at
www.ca4.uscourts.gov. Counsel may move for publication of an unpublished
opinion, citing reasons. If such motion is granted, the unpublished opinion will be
published without change in result.
Id.
173. See id. R. 36(a).
174. See id.
175. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).
176. Id. R. 34(a) (emphasis added).
177. See Jay O’Keeffe, Behind the Scenes at the Fourth Circuit: How the Court Decides
Whether to Award Oral Argument, DE NOVO: VA. APP. L. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2013),
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cases that are considered only on the briefs will not result in published
opinions.178 Thus, it does appear that the Fourth Circuit has dealt with
increasing caseloads and judicial vacancies to some extent by adopting
procedural changes to accommodate the work.179
In the Fourth Circuit, the usual practice has been to issue most
unpublished opinions per curiam so that no authoring judge is identified.180
Some of the judges who have joined the court in recent years believe that
the court has begun issuing more unpublished opinions with an identified
author.181 For example, Judge Wynn previously served on the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, and although it is unusual for that court to issue
per curiam opinions, its rules as to nonpublication are similar to those of
the Fourth Circuit.182 In my discussions with many judges, it seems that
their legal backgrounds, and particularly, their prior judicial experiences,
inform their approaches on whether a decision to issue an opinion as
unpublished or per curiam (or both).183

http://www.virginiaappellatelaw.com/2013/09/articles/oral-argument/behind-the-scenes-atthe-fourth-circuit-how-the-court-decides-whether-to-award-oral-argument/ (“The Fourth
Circuit hears oral argument in about 9% of the roughly 5,000 cases it considers each year.”);
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, N.C. APP. PRAC. BLOG, http://www.
ncapb.com/courts/united-states-court-of-appeals-for-the-fourth-circuit/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2015) (noting that “most appeals in the Fourth Circuit are decided on the briefing alone
without oral argument”).
178. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text.
179. See David R. Stras & Shaun M. Pettigrew, The Rising Caseload in the Fourth
Circuit: A Statistical and Institutional Analysis, 61 S.C. L. REV. 421, 432 (2010) (providing
a detailed analysis of the caseloads of the Fourth Circuit from 1979 to 2008 and the
procedural and systemic changes to address the increasing caseloads, including reduction of
oral arguments, use of law clerks and staff counsel, and use of unpublished opinions).
180. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, supra
note 125.
181. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C.
(Nov. 26, 2013); Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
Richmond, Va. (Sept. 17, 2013).
182. Compare N.C. R. APP. P. 30(e) (providing that the North Carolina Court of Appeals
may designate an opinion as unpublished if it “involves no new legal principles
and . . . would have no value as a precedent”), with 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)–(b) (providing that an
opinion may be published only if it “establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule
of law” within the Fourth Circuit, “involves a legal issue of continuing public interest,”
“criticizes existing law,” “contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative,”
“resolves a conflict between panels” of the circuit, or “creates a conflict with a decision in
another circuit”).
183. The number of unpublished per curiam opinions issued by the federal courts is
significant. See Hannon, supra note 14, at 238–39 (concluding that “close to two-thirds of
the per curiam opinions issued by the federal circuit courts of appeals after 1970 have been
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The Fourth Circuit judges are assisted by their law clerks and the staff
attorney’s office.184 Each judge has four staff members, including either
four clerks, or three clerks and one judicial assistant.185 The staff attorney’s
office currently has approximately forty attorneys who assist in preparing
cases for the panels of judges and draft opinions in cases that are not
designated for oral argument.186 The number of attorneys in the staff
attorney’s office has recently declined due to budget cuts, as those who
leave are not replaced.187 The judges’ chambers have been forced to take
on some of the duties of preparing drafts of opinions in cases that are not
orally argued because of the cuts in staff counsel.188 The Office of the
Clerk of Court “provides case management and automation support for the
court,” including matters such as calendaring, appointment of counsel, and
maintaining records.189
B. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sits in Chicago, Illinois, and
hears appeals from the seven federal district courts in Illinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin.190 The court currently has fourteen active judges, including
unpublished opinions,” and that “the vast majority of these unpublished per curiam opinions
were issued from 1985 to the present”).
184. See Offices, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/about
-the-court/offices (last visited Apr. 18, 2015); see also FED. R. APP. P. 45.
185. See Who Does What, Chambers Staff: Qs & As, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
federal/courts.nsf/autoframe!openform&nav=menu1&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/352
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015). The clerks who serve in a judge’s chambers are often called
“elbow clerks,” referring to the closeness of the relationship between the judge and his or
her clerks. Id. The clerk is “figuratively and sometimes literally, ‘at the judge’s elbow,’
unlike other clerks and lawyers who work for the court in other capacities such as staff
attorneys.” Id.; see also Elbow Clerk, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
an “elbow clerk” as “[a]n individual judge’s personal clerk”—usually “one who works
closely with the judge”).
186. Beth Scherer, What Is the Fourth Circuit’s Office of Staff Counsel and What Do
They Do?, N.C. APP. PRAC. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.ncapb.com/2014/03/25/whatis-the-fourth-circuits-office-of-staff-counsel-and-what-do-they-do/.
187. For example, a job posting for a judicial clerkship on the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Richmond, Virginia, notes throughout the posting that budgetary constraints may
influence the number of individuals hired for the positions. See Federal Clerkship
Opportunity, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ca4.uscourts.
gov/docs/pdfs/staffattorneyvacancyoct2014.pdf?sfvrsn=4.
188. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, supra
note 125.
189. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 99.
190. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SEVENTH CIR.,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/faqs.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2015); Geographic Boundaries
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five sitting senior judges.191
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit also has a local rule that
governs the publication of opinions.192 Under Seventh Circuit Rule 32.1,
the court states a straight-forward policy: “to avoid issuing unnecessary
opinions.”193 The rule further provides that “[t]he court may dispose of an
appeal by opinion or order,” and opinions (including per curiam opinions)
“are released in printed form, are published in the Federal Reporter, and
constitute the law of the circuit.”194 Unpublished orders, on the other hand,
“are unsigned, are released in photocopied form, are not published in the
Federal Reporter, and are not treated as precedents.”195 The rule allows
parties to request by motion “that an order be reissued as an opinion,”
provided that the motion “state[s] why this change would be
appropriate.”196
The Seventh Circuit’s rule, unlike the Fourth Circuit’s rule, gives
almost no guidance on what the court considers in making the publication
decision. The Seventh Circuit’s rule simply states the policy to avoid
“issuing unnecessary opinions.”197 In addition, Seventh Circuit Rule 32.1
sets forth a more detailed description of the types of dispositions that the
court may issue (either an “opinion” or “order”).198
This distinction may come as a surprise to some attorneys who think
of opinions as either “published” opinions that have precedential value, or
“unpublished” opinions that have no precedential value. But as Rule 32.1

of United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
191. See United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, http://
ballotpedia.org/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Seventh_Circuit (last visited
Apr. 18, 2015); Contact Information, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SEVENTH CIR., http://
www.ca7.uscourts.gov/contact.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
The vacant seat was created when Judge Terence T. Evans took senior status in
January 2010 (he died in 2011 and his seat has not yet been filled); additionally, Judge John
Daniel Tinder plans to retire in 2015. See Amy Rabideau Silvers, Evans, 71, Served on
Federal Appeals Court, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/obituaries/127523413.html; Gabriella Khorasanee, Judge
John Daniel Tinder Is Retiring, Rejection Letter Reveals, FINDLAW: SEVENTH CIR. NEWS &
INFO. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2014, 1:22 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/seventh_circuit/2014/03/
judge-john-daniel-tinder-is-retiring-rejection-letter-reveals.html.
192. 7TH CIR. R. 32.1.
193. Id. R. 32.1(a).
194. Id. R. 32.1(b).
195. Id.
196. Id. R. 32.1(c).
197. Id. R. 32.1(a).
198. Id. R. 32.1(b).
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states, there are actually more nuanced designations for cases. If a
researcher wants to know both the precedential value of the opinion and the
identity of the judge who issued the ruling, this information may not be
readily available, depending on the opinion’s designation.
There are at least three types of dispositions that an appellate court
may issue in addition to a simple ruling on a dispositive motion.199 At the
highest or most transparent level is the traditional published opinion, which
is signed by one of the judges on the panel as author.200 Slightly below this
in transparency but equal in precedential value is the per curiam published
opinion, which identifies the panel, but not an authoring judge (although
one of the judges was actually assigned as the author, even if a draft was
prepared by staff counsel).201 For purposes of research on the courts or
coding a case for a database, it would be impossible to identify an author
for these opinions.202 Sometimes these opinions are issued in cases that
may present a security risk to the court, and although the panel must be
identified, no single judge can be blamed for the ruling.203 Both the Fourth
and Seventh Circuits issue per curiam published opinions and signed
unpublished opinions, but there are differences in the courts’ practices. At
the Seventh Circuit, the court refers to unpublished written dispositions
with no identified author from cases that were not orally argued as
“unpublished orders.” These unpublished orders typically include a
reasoned explanation of the court’s ruling and may be pages, not just
sentences, long; but the tradition at the Seventh Circuit is to call these
“unpublished orders” and they are labeled as “orders.”204 These are
199. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 30 (“Judges have three basic options regarding
how a decision of the court is provided to the public: (1) a signed published opinion; (2) a
per curiam opinion; or (3) an unpublished nonprecedential opinion or order.”).
200. See 7TH CIR. R. 32.1.
201. See id.; see also Per Curiam, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/per_curiam (last visited Apr. 30, 2015) (defining a per curiam opinion as one “from an
appellate court that does not identify any specific judge who may have written the
opinion”).
202. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and
Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1111–17, 1079 (2005) (citations omitted)
(discussing that some researchers have attempted to identify authoring judges, and in
particular, which judges actually write their own opinions, based upon linguistic analysis,
citation patterns, language patterns, and other features of written opinions).
203. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, supra note 106.
204. Searching on WestlawNext for “per curiam” opinions issued by the Seventh Circuit
that were “not selected for publication” in 2014 returns zero cases. The same search for
“per curiam” cases that were “not selected for publication” in 2014 on the Fourth Circuit
returns four cases. Yet, a search of Seventh Circuit cases for the same time period that were
“not selected for publication” but were not designated as “per curiam” returns 397 cases,
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distinguished from “opinions” as well as shorter, procedural orders entered
either by the clerk, or by a single judge or a panel, dealing with various
motions in the case.205 “Unpublished orders” normally do not identify one
of the panel judges as author, but the court does not refer to them as per
curiam opinions or unpublished opinions, although they would seem to be
de facto per curiam opinions.206
At the Seventh Circuit, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the default position
for any case in which the parties are represented by counsel is that the case
will be orally argued.207 Even some pro se cases are orally argued,
although the time they receive will normally be limited.208 As at the Fourth
Circuit, if a civil pro se case presents important issues, the court may on
occasion appoint counsel to represent a party or parties for the appeal.209
Not all cases that are argued receive the same amount of time. The
Seventh Circuit has “short argument” days in which each side is allotted

with the panel identified, but not the author. This search of Fourth Circuit cases in 2014
returns only forty cases.
205. See 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b).
206. The designation of “order” versus “opinion” may also alter the cost of public access
to the document in the PACER system. PACER’s Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule,
issued April 1, 2013, provides free access for certain documents and to certain parties. See
Electronic Public Fee Access Schedule (Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.pacer.gov/documents/
epa_feesched.pdf. Section (8), Automatic Fee Exemptions, provides that “[n]o fee is
charged for access to judicial opinions.” Id. As a general rule, nonparties to a case are
charged ten cents per page for documents in PACER. Id. The document’s designation as an
“order” or “opinion” is made by the issuing court. The issue of cost of public access to
federal court case files is another area of dispute. Steve Schultze, a program officer for
Internet Freedom at the United States Department of State, describes the problem as
follows:
At some point, PACER added the option for judges to specify that a particular
document was an “opinion.” When users download these documents, they are not
charged. But what is an opinion? There have been years of hand-wringing over
this question. Courts have been wildly inconsistent in their rate of accurately
flagging opinions. The Administrative Office commissioned an expensive study.
This is all ridiculous, because the law makes no distinction between fees for
opinions versus other records. What’s more, in order to find the opinions in the
first place, the average user has to search for them (and pay) and view the docket
(and pay).
Steve Schultze, Making Excuses for Fees on Electronic Public Records, FREEDOM TO
TINKER (Feb. 7, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/sjs/making-excuses-for-fees-onelectronic-public-records/.
207. Compare 7TH CIR. R. 34(a)(2), with 4TH CIR. R. 36(a).
208. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 147–48.
209. Compare id. at 88, with FED. R. APP. P. 34(b).
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ten minutes for argument.210 The Office of the Circuit Executive reviews
each case and recommends argument times, and the assigned judges make
the final determination as to the time allotted for argument of each case.211
This flexibility in setting argument times allows the court to hear
arguments in more cases that would likely not be allowed oral argument at
most federal appellate courts and gives more time to the more complex
cases which merit receiving the full hour. This procedure is based upon
Seventh Circuit Rule 34(b)(1), which gives priority to certain types of
cases.212 There is no official link between oral argument and publication of
the opinion at the Seventh Circuit, although certainly a case that is
published is more likely to have been orally argued.
The Seventh Circuit judges are assisted by their clerks and the staff
attorney’s office. Each associate judge has five staff chambers members,
either four elbow clerks and a judicial assistant or five elbow clerks;213 the
chief judge has six chambers staff members.214 The staff attorney’s office
currently has twenty-five attorneys who assist in preparing cases for the
panels of judges and draft opinions in cases that are not designated for oral
argument.215 Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit Office of the
Clerk of Court “provides case management and automation support for the
court,” including matters such as calendaring, appointment of counsel, and
maintaining records.216 In addition, the circuit executive takes an active
role in screening cases and recommending oral argument times.217 Collins
Fitzpatrick, the circuit executive, has served the federal courts in the
Seventh Circuit since 1971, first as a law clerk, and then as a senior staff
attorney.218 In 1976, he became the first—and so far the only—circuit

210. See Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Changes to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit Over a Third of a Century, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527, 535–36 (2008).
211. See 7TH CIR. R. 34(b)(1). Thus, a typical argument day at the Seventh Circuit may
include some cases that are allowed fifteen or twenty minutes per side, as well as cases that
receive the traditional thirty minutes per side.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 185.
214. See Chambers Staff: Qs & As, supra note 185.
215. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 135, 137; see also Who Does What: Court
Legal Staff, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&
nav=menu5b&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/355 (last visited May 10, 2015).
216. HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 99.
217. See id. at 137, 140.
218. See About the Authors: Attorney’s Guide to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
ST. B. WIS., http://marketplace.wisbar.org/Pages/AK0224_Authors.aspx (last visited Apr.
29, 2015).
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executive for the Seventh Circuit.219
In my interviews at the Seventh Circuit, judges and staff alike echoed
the sentiments of Don Wall, counsel to the circuit executive, who
explained, “our culture here is that we give reasoned decisions for every
case that is fully briefed.”220 He noted that some courts may dispose of
cases in a one-line order, leaving litigants to wonder why the court made its
decision, but the Seventh Circuit gives a reasoned decision in each case.221
Circuit Executive Collins Fitzpatrick made almost exactly the same
observation in his 2008 law-review article: “The court prides itself in
writing reasoned decisions in all cases and arguing all the cases that can be
argued. The Seventh Circuit is an exception among the courts of appeals
on both issues.”222
C. Caseload Comparisons of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
It is not possible to fully understand the work of the federal courts
without considering the caseloads for each court and the types of cases that
each court handles. The caseloads of the federal circuits vary greatly. For
example, at the high and low ends of the circuits is the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, where 12,696 cases were filed from March 2013 to March
2014, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where
only 941 cases were filed during the same time period.223
Table 3 below provides an overview of the various ways in which the

219. For an excellent overview of the changes in the court and its procedures from 1971
to 2007, including the effects of changes in technology, see Fitzpatrick, supra note 210.
220. Interview with Don Wall, Counsel to the Circuit Executive for the Seventh Circuit,
in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 3, 2013).
221. See id.
222. Fitzpatrick, supra note 210, at 540 (citations omitted). Fitzpatrick’s article also
provides the percentages of unpublished cases for each federal circuit for the twelve-month
period ending on September 30, 2007. See id. at 543. At that time, the Fourth Circuit heard
arguments in 8% of cases filed, while the Seventh Circuit heard arguments in 25% of cases
filed. See id. Ninety-three percent of the Fourth Circuit’s cases were unpublished, while
55% of the Seventh Circuit’s cases were unpublished. Id. During that time, the Seventh
Circuit had the highest publication rate of the twelve federal circuit courts of appeals and the
Fourth Circuit had the lowest. Id. The Fourth Circuit also had the lowest rate of oral
argument of the federal courts of appeals, while the Seventh Circuit had the highest rate of
cases argued. See id. The First Circuit, which, by far, had the smallest caseload of the
federal courts of appeals, heard argument in about 30% of cases filed. See id.
223. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.B (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b/
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2014/03/31.
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Fourth and Seventh Circuits terminated cases on the merits in 2014.224
Table 3: Comparison of Cases Filed and Methods of Disposition for the
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in
2013–2014225
Method of Disposition

Fourth
Circuit
5,061
3,059
432

Seventh
Circuit
2,949
1,664
644

4,023

1,868

Written opinion/order: signed, published

217

609

Written opinion/order: signed, unpublished

473

2

Written opinion/order: reasoned, unsigned,
published
Written opinion/order: reasoned, unsigned,
unpublished

7

26

2,906

1,089

Cases filed
Pro se filings
Cases terminated after oral argument
Appeals terminated on the merits

V. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDGES
The Fourth and Seventh Circuit judges’ responses as to jurisprudential
factors were nearly the same.226 This is not surprising, as the first two
factors are the most frequently cited as the primary reason for
nonpublication.227 Most judges view cases that may be considered as
controversial or politically sensitive based upon their facts no differently
224. Because of the differences in designation of cases filed as “opinions” or “orders,” as
discussed above, this Table identifies the cases by the actual document filed and not by its
title. Thus, an unpublished “order” as used at the Seventh Circuit or an unpublished per
curiam “opinion” would both be described in Table 3 as a “written, reasoned, and unsigned”
disposition.
225. The information in Table 3 is published by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL
BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-12/judicial-business/
2014/09/30; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS STATISTICAL
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY tbl.B-1 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/
table/b-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2014/06/30.
226. For a summary of responses as to all of the publication decision factors from the
interviews of judges at both courts, see supra Table 1.
227. See supra Table 1.
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than those with less interesting facts. The only tendency that judges
endorse as to these cases is a bit more of an inclination to publish due to the
need for transparency and not wanting to be seen as trying to hide
something—something that is not hidden either way, since all of the
opinions are available. Indeed, some judges say that they are more likely to
publish in controversial cases.228 But a published case is not only available
for all to read; it also has authority as precedent, so by publication, the
judge is demonstrating that he or she is willing to take a precedential
position on the controversial issue. But a case with controversial facts or
issues will still not be published if the principles of law involved are well
established, for the same reasons as any other. In addition, some cases will
be unpublished due to case-quality factors, discussed below, or collegiality
factors.
Most judges on the Fourth and Seventh Circuits also consider casequality factors in making a decision to publish.229 In some instances, the
court cannot address potentially important issues raised by a case due to
failure to preserve error in the court below, rule violations, or other legal
missteps. But even if the case is properly before the court with its issues
intact and presented to a minimum level of legal effectiveness, a judge who
believes that the case has not been well argued, researched, or supported by
a complete record may still have hesitation about publication. As Judge
Wilkinson puts it, “you need to know what you don’t know. When I am on
the bench, I am aware of the great unknowns.”230 No judge wants to
publish a precedential case that will run afoul of established but overlooked
law, or which will disrupt the practices and expectations of the legal
community or public in a way that the Court failed to appreciate due to the
poor presentation of the case.
The most significant differences in the judges’ responses came from
the factors in the last category: collegiality.231 These factors attempt to
capture a bit of the courts’ cultures, and how the cultures of the two courts
differ. Part of this difference has undoubtedly developed due to the
disparity in caseloads and court staff. Judges and staff on both courts
readily note this difference. One Seventh Circuit judge noted that the
ability to hear more cases and publish more opinions is “a luxury that we
have here” because the court has a lighter caseload than many federal

228. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, supra note 106.
229. See supra Table 1.
230. Telephone Interview with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, supra note 1.
231. See supra Table 1.
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appellate courts.232 The Fourth Circuit simply has a heavier caseload, but
almost the same number of judges, and despite the claims of members of
the court that going for many years without a full complement of judges did
not influence their work, it is difficult to believe that the long-term open
seats had no effect on the way that the court handles its cases.233 Like the
Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has gotten its work done, but its
procedures are different.234 The Fourth Circuit’s procedures have enabled
it to deal with its heavy caseload and to fulfill its constitutional duties, but
these procedures allow for fewer oral arguments and result in fewer
published cases.235
Customs and traditions are pervasive in all courts, not just the federal
appellate courts. Some customs are obvious, such as the procedures the
courts follow during oral arguments. Judges normally sit in a particular
order based upon seniority. In the Fourth Circuit, the judges come down
from the bench after each argument to greet the attorneys in each case.
Many of these customs and traditions address how the court performs its
work and how the judges work together. Although these types of traditions
exist in all workplaces, they may be even more important in a court. Each
judge is literally her own boss. Each judge operates her chambers as she
sees fit. Federal judges do not face the risk of demotion or termination.
Although courts have chief judges who handle the administrative and
organizational needs of the court and supervise court staff, the chief judge
is not a supervisor of the judges in the usual sense. So the customs and
traditions of a particular court—the court culture—are essential for the
collegiality and efficient functioning of the court. Some of the court’s
traditions or customs are embodied in its local rules or written internal
procedures, but many are unwritten—they are passed on in an informal
way from the older judges to the newer judges, and they are supported and
maintained by the staff of the court. Some customs are merely ceremonial,
but other customs actually dictate how the judges do their work—how
cases are assigned, how cases are circulated from one judge to another, and
how judges communicate with one another about a case that is being
written.
Court culture and customs are reflected in the official written rules
and procedures, but the written rules do not capture the entire process.
Court culture plays a large role in how the judges perceive and practice the

232. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill.
(Nov. 3, 2013).
233. See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text; see also supra Table 3.
234. See supra notes 166–210 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 166–78 and accompanying text.
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factors that influence publication decisions. Each court has its own culture
surrounding the decisions regarding publication, and each judge has his or
her own understanding of that culture.236 Some of these customs and
practices undoubtedly develop from the necessity of dealing with the
caseloads, but they also develop based upon the history and personalities of
each court. They develop based upon the particular caseloads of each
court, which differ based on the geographical location of the district courts
from which it receives appeals, as the court creates procedures to deal with
heavy caseloads in particular areas. They differ based upon the prior
judicial experiences brought to the court by new judges, and they may
change over time as caseloads and personnel change.
CONCLUSION
Differences in workloads, combined with the decision-making styles
of the judges and the court culture, lead to the disparity in publication rates
between the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. The workload
contributes to the creation of the courts’ culture, and then the courts’
culture reinforces the organizational methods of dealing with the workload.
Judges on federal courts typically have long tenures, and they tend to work
together for many years in close-knit communities of judges, clerks, and
staff. Although both courts do the same thing—hear appeals and write
opinions—each has developed its own methods of doing so. Seemingly
mundane procedural details, and not necessarily the legal merits of the
case, influence whether a case will or will not end up as a published
opinion.
The fact that an opinion is unpublished does not mean that it is
unimportant237 to the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction,238 or to research on

236. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1915–17 (citations omitted). Judge Harry
Edwards notes that the attitudinal model, which characterizes judges as ideologically “left”
or “right,” fails “to comprehend the importance of assessing judges’ work in the context of
the judiciary’s institutional norms.” Id. at 1916–17 (citing Howard Gillman & Cornell W.
Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes, Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court DecisionMaking, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 1, 4–5 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman eds., 1999)). “There is a process of socialization and acculturation during which
new judges join the judiciary’s culture in which respect for law is accorded a high value.”
Id. at 1917. Or, as Songer notes, decisions regarding publication may be based upon
“largely unarticulated assumptions that shape the perceptions of judges about the
importance of various cases which are derived from the socialization, values and
experiences of the various judges.” Songer, supra note 11, at 313.
237. Judges recognize that each case is vitally important to the parties and counsel in that
case, but that not all cases are important to the jurisprudence of the circuit.
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the behavior of the courts and judges themselves. That may have been true
when courts first began issuing unpublished opinions, but as caseloads have
increased, the practical bar for publication has moved up higher and higher.
The substantive content of the caseloads of the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, even if different in numbers, is not so dissimilar that one could
conclude that the Fourth Circuit simply gets a much higher number of
frivolous appeals, pro se cases, Anders brief cases, or other cases that
would not typically be considered as meriting publication. There is no
reason to believe that the quality of the attorneys appearing before the
Fourth Circuit is inferior to those before the Seventh Circuit or that the
Fourth Circuit cases would present such a dearth of important legal issues
that the difference in publication rates could be explained simply by the
quality and types of cases coming before the court.
The importance of the internal court culture in the work of a court
cannot be overstated, but it has been almost entirely ignored in most of the
empirical research on the federal appellate courts. This omission is not
surprising, as court culture is difficult to study or quantify. Some of these
difficulties with empirical research on the federal courts have been
examined by Judge Harry T. Edwards.239 Because researchers focus on a
few of the more readily quantifiable features of judges, such as political
party of the appointing president, Judge Edwards notes that this research
leaves out such essential factors in decision-making that the results of the
research are subject to serious question.240 He notes that panel deliberation
is extremely important,241 but that this feature is not only nonquantifiable, it
is unavailable since it is confidential.242 Given the importance of the many
factors that may be involved in the publication decision, one judge noted
that research based only on the published cases “is easy research, reporting
238. Why some cases are unpublished is simply a mystery, and Justices on the United
States Supreme Court have, on rare occasions, commented on this. See supra note 14.
239. See Edwards, supra note 101, at 1640; Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4.
240. Edwards, supra note 101, at 1640–41 (citations omitted).
241. See id. at 1641–43. But see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 61 (citing Edwards &
Livermore, supra note 4, at 1949). But Judge Posner believes that judicial deliberation is
“overrated.” Id. at 308. He describes deliberations as having a “curiously stilted character,”
since this occurs only after oral arguments and in a format that
reflects the potential awkwardness of a freewheeling discussion among person
who are not entirely comfortable arguing with each other because they were not
picked to form an effective committee, and who as an aspect of the diversity that
results from the considerations that shape judicial appointments may have
sensitivities that inhibit discussion of issues involving race, sex, religion, criminal
rights, immigrants’ rights, and other areas of law that arouse strong emotions.
Id. at 62.
242. Edwards, supra note 101, at 1641–43.
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on what something looks like, not what it is. If the premise is wrong, the
conclusion will be wrong.”243
Although the personalities of the judges and the panel deliberations
may defy empirical study, a court’s procedures and organization influence
its publication rates, and these things can—and should—be studied.
Researchers and courts should consider how procedural and organizational
changes may have unintended consequences for the jurisprudence.
For example, Judge Wynn described how some changes in the
procedures of the North Carolina Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of
North Carolina changed the way cases were assigned for oral argument,
which ultimately led to a transition in the way that life-imprisonment cases
are considered.244 Prior to December 1995, cases in which a defendant was
sentenced to life imprisonment were appealed directly to the North
Carolina Supreme Court and all were orally argued, but the 1995
amendment to section 7A-27(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes
provided that only capital cases in which the death penalty was actually
imposed would be appealed directly to the supreme court, thus decreasing
the caseload of the supreme court and increasing that of the court of
appeals.245 At first, the court of appeals continued to hold oral arguments
for all life-imprisonment cases, just as the supreme court had done. But
over time, the court of appeals stopped hearing oral arguments on all lifeimprisonment cases, and sometimes these cases are now even considered as
“fast track” cases. Judge Wynn noted that “the bar seems to be unfazed by
this.”246 But this was a fundamental change in the way that the court has
dealt with cases of life imprisonment, driven by a combination of
increasing caseloads and changes in the court’s internal procedures, and not
by the legal merits of the cases themselves.247 Life in prison is still life in
prison, and the substance of the law is unchanged; but the court changed its
procedures, and now these cases are more likely to be unpublished.
Changes to court procedures to address workload may lead to
unintended consequences in the development of the law. One of the
primary procedural differences between the Fourth and Seventh Circuits is
the point at which the decision as to publication is made and the ways that
the cases go through the triage process.248 There is also a difference in the
point at which the decision regarding publication is made; the decision is

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Interview with Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., supra note 63.
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (2013).
Interview with Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., supra note 63.
See id.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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normally made at the Fourth Circuit when cases are designated for oral
argument.249 It seems that when there is more direct judicial involvement
in the case-triage process, more cases may end up being argued and issued
as published opinions. Moreover, the later in the process that the
publication decision is made, the more likely that an opinion may be
published, as the judges may realize while researching and drafting the
opinion that a case presents questions worthy of publication that may have
been initially overlooked. Courts should consider the potential effects of
their procedures on the level of scrutiny given to cases and how procedures
may favor or disfavor publication.
These differences in case processing are reflected in each circuit’s
official rules and internal operating procedures regarding oral argument and
publication, but there are also subjective factors influencing the triage and
publication decisions. In my interviews and surveys, I found that the
general understanding and customs of court members as to the publication
decision, part of the court culture, are also quite different. But with both
courts, the factors that determine the publication decision clearly
encompass more than the official publication rules. Because of the many
factors that judges consider, and the varying weight each judge may give to
a particular factor, publication rates even between judges on the same court
tend to vary.250
Because of the information that can be hidden in the publication
decisions and depending upon the issue that the researcher is considering,
researchers should consider including unpublished cases, to the extent
possible. Whether unpublished cases need to be considered will depend on
the particular issue being researched, as well as the circuit or judges being
studied. A database that includes only the published opinions for 2012
from the Seventh Circuit still includes 41.5% of its cases, a substantial and
perhaps representative sample, while including only published opinions
from the Fourth Circuit would be 10.8% of its cases, which is not likely a
representative sample. It may be that databases of cases that focus on

249. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
250. See Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice, supra note 25, at 42.
As Choi and Gulati note:
There are significant differences in the caseloads across the circuits, but the one
commonality is that the burdens are overwhelming. They are so overwhelming
that almost no judge can hope to provide a publication-worthy statement of
reasons in every case that comes before the judge. Some judges, however,
provide published statements of reasons in more cases than others.
See id. (citation omitted).
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ideologically charged cases, such as the Sunstein database,251 are even
more likely to be influenced by other factors that should be considered in
the research. Some judges may tend to avoid publication based on a belief
that if the law is well established, there is no need to stir the pot by
publishing an opinion about a controversial issue,252 while others tend to
publish these cases simply because they are controversial.253
The reasons that judges decide to publish an opinion may contain
essential information about the way the court works and how the judges
decide cases. For this reason, any study of judicial behavior that relies only
upon published opinions should be scrutinized carefully. Depending on the
particular issue being studied, the exclusion of unpublished opinions may
lead to erroneous conclusions, and the potential importance of the
unpublished cases may vary based on the particular court issuing the
opinion, and even based on the judge. Published opinions are the tip of the
iceberg, but unpublished opinions are the bottom. Sailors ignore the
bottom of the iceberg to their peril. Judges and researchers may wish that
they could ignore unpublished opinions, since there are so many, but
unpublished opinions comprise the majority of the work of the federal
appellate courts and should not be ignored.
Table 4: Changes in the Publication Decision Process
Change in the publication decision
process over time

Fourth Circuit
(Number of judges)
1

Seventh Circuit
(Number of judges)
0

Greater tendency to publish
No change in tendency to publish
Frequency of recommendations to
other judges regarding publication

4
2

1
4

Rarely or occasionally
Never

6
1

5
0

Lesser tendency to publish

251. For example, the second database used in The Behavior of Federal Judges was
compiled by Cass Sunstein and others (Sunstein database) and includes “all the published
court of appeals opinions from 1995 (plus some from earlier years) and 2001 in fourteen
subject-matter areas believed to have significant ideological stakes, such as abortion, capital
punishment, and racial discrimination.” See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 157. The
authors, Epstein, Landes, and Posner updated the Sunstein database to 2008, adding agediscrimination cases. Id.
252. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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